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Ever since the end of World Her II, Europe has remained oartltloned
Into East and West. Within the bloc of nations comprising the Eastern 
half of this division, Coimgnlst regimes, kept 1n power by force or the 
threat of force, rule with an Iron hand. Periodically, however, the peo­
ples of these nations rise 1n opposition to their oppressors. Because the 
Western world virtually abandoned these countries 1n 1945 and, thereby, con­
tributed to their current plight and because of the increasing political and 
economic interdependence of all nations, the struggle waqed for freedom with­
in these countries is of particular importance. In fact, since the East 
bloc represents a defacto portion of the Soviet emolre, one organized mili­
tarily under the Warsaw Pact and directly facing the forces of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, efforts made by the Soviets or their rullnq 
proxies to suppress popular uprisings always carry with them the possibility 
of engulfing the whole of Europe and perhaps the entire world in a general
war.
Having clarified the Importance of East bloc uprisings and reform move­
ments within a general context, we may now turn to the subject of this oaper: 
the Internal factors oromoting such popular insurrections and reform efforts. 
Needless to say, the causes of reform and revolution are many and comolex, 
and no one could hone to identify then all nor specify their exact relation­
ship to one another. With this in mind, the author set out to investigate 
and Identify only a few of the more prominent factors conducive to East bloc
1
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turmoil and reform. To this and. a modal consisting of three main factors 
Including economic stagnation, an increased atmosphere of liberalization, 
and the leadership of Intellectual organizations *111 be examined. !n addi­
tion to these chief considerations, efforts will be made to Identify whether 
a triggering Incident— touching off mass opposition— snarked the onset of a
particular reform movement and whether a progressive Party faction and Its
head played a role In promoting reform. Finally, factors Uniting the scope 
of changes and Influencing a Soviet decision to Intervene will be explored.
The specific uprisings and movements examined within this paoer Include 
Pllsen (1953), Berlin (1953), Poland (1956), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia 
(1968), Poland (1970), and Poland (1980-81).
II. The Prelude to Change
Stalin's Death: Uncertainty and a Reduction of Forced Cohesion
Stalin's death in March of 1953 signaled a major turning doint in Soviet* 
East bloc relations. Althouqh the Stalinist system didn't crumble instantly,
1t developed many serious problems leading to its ultimate transformation. 
Gradually, the forced political and economic cohesion characterizing Soviet- 
Eastern European relations under Stalin and owing largely to the dictator's 
brutal determinism and use of the secret oollce aave wav to a system permit­
ting greater nationalistic diversity in choosing a oath to Socialism, thouqh 
many limitations still remained. 1
During the uncertainty following Stalin's death, a succession struggle 
and pressing economic problems (centering around investment oolicles) sur­
faced 1n the USSR. Out of the turmoil emerned a collective leadership headed 
by Georgl Malenkov. Seeking to address the most pressing problems, Malenkov 
stressed reorganization of Party and administrative branches and a reevalua­
tion of economic policies.^ Not surprisingly, such proposals created addition­
al factionalism within the political elite and resulted in a lack of direction 
for the Soviet satellites. As Srzezinskl points out: . . ambivalence in
Moscow, thanks to Stalinism, meant ambivalence in Prague or Warsaw.” Re­
sponding to the situation as seeds do to the coming o# sprinq, disaffected 
Eastern European elements slowly took root.
Although characterized by instability, the Malenkov leadership quicklv 
moved to solidify its position. The burneoninr oower of the secret police, 
Stalin's prize Instrument of terror, received the first blow. In July 1953
3
KGB Chief Lavrenti Beria was arrested. His subsequent execution along with 
six colleagues promoted further bloc independence from Moscow, With Beria's 
execution the choicer chain of continuous Soviet surveillance and interfer­
ence was loosened from around the necks of the East bloc leaderships. In 
fact, the decline of the secret police was counied with a new official empha­
sis on relations within the framework of a leqal process. Although words
4
and actions don't always mesh, Moscow's new line was encouraging.
Having dealt with Beria, the new regime gradually instituted a reform 
program entitled the "New Course." Under the New Course power monopolies 
were to be reduced, and, as Moscow went, so eventually and obediently went the 
East bloc, with Important repercussions. Thouoh initial oower sharinq plans 
within the bloc nations were cosmetic in nature (Hungary being an exception), 
the Idea that power shouldn't be concentrated Into the hands of a few later 
led to greater Intra-Party strife. Indeed, progressive East bloc Communists
5
could and did use the issue to undermine the Old Guard.
Notwithstanding its political content, the New Course mainly dealt with 
economic Issues. Malenkov, seeking to expand popular support for his leader­
ship through an increased standard of living, shifted economic priorities from 
heavy (capital intensive) industries to liqht (consumer) industries. To be 
sure, the regime realized that any such change necessitated purging the Stalin 
1st command economy of its most unrealistic and unresponsive elements and, 
therefore, overzealous and unreachable production goals were revised.
Although Malenkov's economic reforms suffered a reversal following his 
fall from power, they remained in effect long enough to have a significant im­
pact on the satellites. After some proddino from Moscow, most East European 
Communist leaderships embraced aspects of the New Course, especially the re­
forms reducing substantial popular dissatisfaction with past policies. Of
Millw
course, some foot-dragging did exist, particularly in Chechoslovakia and
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Thus, in^tjie-aftermath of Stalin's death, several factors crucial to 
reform emerged. First, an unavoidable relaxation accompanied the curbing of 
the secret police and the decreased emphasis on bloc conformity. Secondly, 
by stressing power sharing, Moscow helped undermine Old Guard elements.
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Finally, New Course economic reforms provided an opportunity for new views 
and solutions to be forwarded, something very alien to the Stalinist system 
where priorities seldom, If ever, changed.
One more extremely important point emerges from the above discussion; 
namely, the changes incorporated in the New Course, representing if nothing 
else an implicit rejection of many Stallnistic economic oolicies, severly 
damaged the credibility of Cast bloc Communist Parties. The more closely a 
particular leadership was associated with Stalin's policies, the more exten­
sive the damage. Consequently, Party progressives could assail the Old Guard's 
exposed position. As the monolithic image of Communist Partv infallibility
and cohesion faded, the willingness of intellectuals and the masses to rise
0
in opposition increased.
The First Cracks in the Dike: Pilsen and 3erlin
In the spring of 1953, although economically well off by Socialist stan­
dards, Czechoslovakia nevertheless suffered from an economic scourge brought 
on by its leadership's pursuit of inefficient and ruthless Stalinist policies.
Because of peasant opposition to government collectivization drives, agricul­
tural production dropped dramatically and produced an inflatlon-creacinq once
:3( 
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imbalance. Rather than denouncing and reforming earlier oolicies, the regime 
devalued currency by ssuing new notes. The new and unfavorable exchange rates
varied fro# between 3:1 and 59: 1, causing a one-fifth reduction 1n nominal 
orlcas. Although aimed at allnlnoting the excess ourchaisnn power of inde- 
pendant farmers and small businessman {thereby stabilizing prices), the poll-
. a
cy actually diminished worker buying power.
Because the new currency nolicy effectively wiped out savings, many 
workers saw their dreams dwindle along with their hard earned crowns. Of 
more immediate concern, however, government reductions In worker purchasing 
power were not matched by similar reductions 1n food orlces, an area receiving 
a large portion of worker Income. As a result, the government announcement 
of 30 Hay was followed by riots In Pllsen on 1 June and similar disturbances 
In floravska Ostrava between 30 Hay and 4 June. In Pllsen demonstrators sacked 
the towm hall and called for free elections. Although a military unit was 
sent, Its soldiers refused to fire upon the crowd and, therefore, the protest 
was not quelled until the arrival of border guards and police troops.
The Czech leadership didn't take the Pllsen uprising lightly as events 
demonstrated the need for change; nevertheless, the protesters' actions never 
solidified Into an effective reform movement. One major element, economic dl- 
flculty, was present and though conducive to reform (Indeed it stirred the 
workers to action), It was not accompanied by other critical factors. Specifi­
cally, the Party leadershio maintained unity during the disruptions and was not 
yet affected by Malenkov's changes 1n Moscow. As a result, an atmosphere of 
decreased repression was not present nor was progressive Party opposition; in 
fact, the leadership steadfastly refused to denounce or reverse its long­
standing policies. 1 Moreover, the lack of a more tolerant atmosphere was 
paralleled by an absence of a vocal, reform-minded, Intellectual organization;
consequently, no focusing of popular discontent and no organizing and artleu* 
latlng of worker demands developed. Without direction and an atmosphere con­
ducive to reform, the spontaneous workers' actions turned out to be just that—  
spontaneous, disorganized, and easily subdued.
As was the case 1n Czechoslovakia, East Germany found Itself 1n an eco­
nomic bind following Stalin's death. Independent farmers and businessmen, sub­
ject to governmental harassment at every turn, fled to the West at an alarming 
rate. In response, the East German leadership increased agricultural delivery 
quotas and aggressively pursued the collection of back taxes. The ration cards 
of those segments of society thought to be hostile to the government (the
“bourgeoisie") were cancelled and all their assets were confiscated as the
12
leadership sought to stem the flow of capital from East to West.
Similarly, the working class fell subject to the government's wrath as a 
concerted effort to force Increased production was instituted. Workers, al­
ready disillusioned by the sting of inflation, now found themselves confronted
with a ten per cent Increase in output norms. Abused and oppressed, the people
13
of East Germany fled for the West 1n droves.
As the situation became critical, Moscow leaned on the East German leader­
ship and forced the adoption of economic policies in line with Malenkov's pro­
posals for the New Course. Apparently, it was not within Moscow's means to
help the East Germans financially; thus a conciliatory position was the only 
14
alternative. In early June of 1953 the East German Communist Party rescinded
Its earlier position 1n a new resolution:
The resolution enumerated a long list of specific measures 
by which to correct old and recent abuses. For example, food cards 
were to be restored forthwith to people who had been deprived of them, 
and delinquent taxes were to be remitted. Dispossessed small merchants 
and artisans were to be encouraged to reopen their businesses; confis­
cated land was to be given back to all fanners who returned from 'West
Germany; delivery quotes were to be reduced. There was also to 
be an amnesty for people who had been convicted of offenses aqainst 
'national property' (that is, plant thefts ). 15
An undercurrent of great anticipation flowed throughout East German Society 
as the people sensed the weakened position of the government. Hope for rood 
things to come increased, and the workers were particularly anxious for re­
forms pertaining to the norm system. Unfortunately for the workers and the 
leadership, reform of the norm system was not passed. Uoon discovering this 
fact in a trade union article, workers in East Berlin and in other major in­
dustrial East German cities rose in insurrection. Strikes occurred accom­
panied by demands for reunification, free elections, and °artv strongman 
Ulbricht's ouster. As the situation deteriorated and workers refused to be 
pacified by the rescinding of the norm increase, Soviet tanks rolled and sup­
pressed the insurrections with the aid of the Communist police.
Because of the self-criticism and personal rivalry within the East Ger­
man Communist leadership, the East German political upheaval contained some 
elements not found in Czechoslovakia's Pi 1 sen unrest. Neverthless, the two 
events parallel one another quite nicely. As in the Czech scenario, the East 
German incident developed as a result of intolerable economic policies designed 
to check but not redress serious difficulties within the system. In both cases 
the workers responded spontaneously to the government's policy by strikinq, 
rioting, and destroying symbols of Communist rule. Likewise, a significant 
parallel is that neither an atmosphere of increased liberalization nor the lead­
ership of an intellectual organization emerged.
In discussing the East German incident, Keczkemeti points out that
. . . The rebellious workers received no positive encouragement from 
highly placed oooosition or reforming elements. The only stimuli 
from above were the image of a weakened leadership as revealed by re­
treat and self-denunciation, and the provocation of the norm decree. 1?
9Thus, as In the case of Czechoslovakia, East Germany's unquided opposition 
spontaneously burst into action and, just as quickly, was suppressed by the 
authorities.
The Rise of Khrushchev and the Twentieth Congress
Another extremely important development conducive to reform was Khruschev's 
replacinq of Malenkov as Party First Secretary and the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union's (CPSU) Twentieth Party Congress. Althouqh the Malenkov re­
gime's policies had resulted in some unavoidable relaxation within the 
Eastern European community, the Malenkov leadership, nevertheless, sought to 
restrict change to the economic sphere while maintainina Stalinistic rigor 
in virtually all political matters. Khrushchev, on the other hand, gained 
the reins of power by denouncing Malenkov's economic initiatives and stressing 
the necessity of returning to heavy industry intensive development. In order 
to achieve yet another about face in Soviet policy, Khrushchev decided to
trade an unspecified amount of political relaxation and autonomy in exchange
18
for economic conformity.
As Khrushchev's plan began to take shape, the Soviet leader concluded 
that ultimate success hinged on gaininq popular support for the ruling Com­
munist regimes of the East bloc. Those leaders closely identified with ruth­
less Stalinistic methods simply represented a liability and, therefore, were 
not a part of the Khrushchev grand design. Rather, the promotion of popularly- 
supported Comnunist leadership figures gained importance. This policy later 
hauwted Khrushchev by encouraging the rise of nationalistic and progressive 
Party elements in Eastern Europe.
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Durinq the CPSlI's Twentieth Conqress, Khrushchev surprised evervone 
with a biting attack on Stalin and his policies. Apparently, Khrushchev's 
purpose was to expand h1s decision-making flexibility while at the same 
time signaling to bloc leaders that change was in the air. The message 
clearly warned those who blindly followed rigid Stalinistic policies that 
such behavior was no longer acceptable. The new emphasis permitted qreater 
diversification 1n national Institutional development, though within the 
context of Ideological cohesion.^ Thus, Khrushchev hoped to permit some 
independent development at the national level while maintaining Ideological 
leadership and control:
Limited diversity opened a vista for self-suooorting Com­
munist reqlmes but at the price of cohesion of the bloc. Khrushchev's 
somewhat amblquous formula attempted to straddle this dilemma 
by suoerlmoosing Ideological party unity on an acceptance of 
some domestic Institutional diversity, which 1n turn would be 
balanced out by growing economic ties. 21
Decreased Soviet-bloc cohesion resultlno from the Khrushchev plan represented
a gain for reform elements as the suffocatlno repressIveness of Stalinism
gave way to Increased tolerance.
To reiterate, three critical factors emerged from Khrushchev's rise to 
power and the CPSlI's Twentieth Congress which positively contributed to reform. 
To begin with, a reemphasis on heavy Industry meant a return to economic poli­
cies similar to these giving rise to earlier discontent among the people. Al­
though the Stalinist economic system was Inefficient and reouired resources 
which the nations of Eastern Europe did not have, its failure was not attributed 
to such causes but rather to entrenched bureaucrats, who Khrushchev hoped to 
Identify and remove.^ Such simplistic thinking, though perhaps only a ration­
alization for an unpopular policy, eventually resulted in the sort of uneven
neconomic development leading to popular discontent and demands for revolu­
tionary change.
Secondly, the sacrifice of strict cohesion in order to obtain imple­
mentation of unfavorable economic policies provided an atmosphere of in­
creased liberalization essential for progressive elements to develoo and 
confront the orthodox power elite. Because of the emphasis on identifying 
popular leadership figures and removinq officals associated with Stalinist
policies, the rise of progressive Party factions was more readily achieva-
% .
ble.
Finally, in the wake of aforementioned factors, a milieu conducive to 
increased criticism of the Party developed; hence, intellectual organizations 
already In existence could become more assertive. Likewise, the potential 
for new organizations arose as the sterile Intellectual atmosphere of Stalin­
ism, where deviation meant death or imprisonment, gave way to a new more re­
laxed attitude. Most importantly, however, the intelligentsia gained the op­
portunity to organize forums for increasing public awareness and solidifying 
reform sentiments.
III. Khrushchev and Collision: Poland and Hungary (1956)
Poland (The Economic Situation)
Poland's economic situation in early 1956 forewarned impending trouble. 
Though Dhenomenallv high oost-World Mar II growth rates were achieved by 
heavy industry-intensive develooment, the Polish economy began suffering 
the consequences of unbalanced development and the absence of a natural re­
source base to support such a program. Furthermore, bureaucratic inefficien­
cy and the manipulation of economic statistics became apparent as the govern­
ment uncharacteristically admitted discreoencies in its figures. Of par­
ticular concern to the regime was the steadily diminishing flow of manpower 
into industry, a major factor responsible for previous high growth rates.
The main victim of capital intensive development was agriculture. Des­
pite New Course emergency measures directed at imorovlnq agricultural pro­
duction and slowing down collectivization, agricultural target's were not
met. With Moscow's renewed emphasis on heavy industry, agricultural production
2
was destined for further disappointment.
Another area crippled by Poland's investment policy was the people's 
standard of living. In an effort to lift the spirits of the people and encour­
age even greater production, the Polish regime drew on economic stockpiles 
between 1954-55 to artificially boost the standard of living. Nevertheless, 
the projected 40 percent real wage increase for the Six Year Plan (1950-55) 
was not only missed, but the actual Increase ranged somewhere between four
and six percent.3 The wage disappointment, the renewed emphasis on heavy 
industry, and the near exhaustion of economic stockpiles made the Polish 
situation in 1956 a virtual powder ken.
Notwithstanding its importance, the wage situation was • the only 
thorn 1n the Polish worker's side. Because of a lack of consumer produc­
tion and the shoddy quality of those consumer goods produced, workers who 
managed to save money had very little to spend it on. Moreover, the govern­
ment continuously exhorted the workers to higher and higher production goals, 
the benefits of which the workers never saw. Popular disillusion with the 
norm system and general economic conditions may best be summarized by the 
comments of one worker in Tvgodnik Powszechnv (Warsaw), January 29, 1956:
Very low wages paid to workers in some branches of the economy 
and administration, the disproportion between prices and wages, the 
burdenlnq of peoole with work, the Socialist competitions which 
force workers to engage in inhuman efforts, the overloading of peo­
ple with meetings and various social actions, the very poor quali­
ty of goods for everyday use, the lack of housinq, the lordly at­
titude, the stupidity and lack of good faith of officials. . . 4
Against this background, the Polish leaders formulated their Five Year 
Plan (1956-1960). Despite the people's discontent and weariness, the Plan 
called for a sixty to seventy percent increase in production. Although tech­
nology was stressed, the leadership also claimed that labor discipline would 
tighten and norms might be raised. The following table demonstrates some of 
the ambitious goals set by the Party:
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HIn addition to high Industrial targets» the regime forwarded an ag­
gressive program for agricultural development. The components of the olan 
as reached at the Central Committee's Fifth Plenum of February 1956 Included:
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Surprisingly, the leadership Intended to fill Its agricultural quotas while 
reinitiating a substantial collectivization drive.
Although the policies of the Polish leadership reflected orthodox atti­
tudes prevalent 1n Moscow, they did not express the sentiments of the entire 
Polish Central Conmlttee. Indeed, as early as 1954, a strong faction support­
ing balanced development began forming. Desolte the qrowinn strenoth of the 
balanced growth faction, Polish Workers' Party Chief Bierut and his economic 
strongman Mine kept a lid on the situation. However, with Blerut's death at 
the CPSU's Twentieth Congress 1n March 1956, the Polish Politburo's comnosl- 
t1on began to chanqe drastically as pro-B1erut supporters were ousted. Al­
though new First Secretary Ochab succeeded in removing several Bierut support-
q
ers, he maintained Blerut's economic policies, even as they floundered.
The volatile situation 1n Poland finally ignited In a worker Insurrection 
1n Poznan (June 24, 1956). Workers at the Stalin Locomotive Works, already
suffering from the many hardships of the system, blew up at an attempt to 
reduce their pay. Initially, the workers attemoted to go through proper 
channels to have their grievances addressed and were rebuffed. As a re­
sult, a morning demonstration and march was olanned. Although neaceful at 
first, the demonstration quickly became anti-regime and anti-Soviet, turn­
ing into a full blown political insurrection. Battles were fouaht for con­
trol of public buildings, communication centers, and transportation sta­
tions. Workers attacked the headquarters of the Beznleka (secret oolice)
with particular animosity. Nevertheless, after roughly a day and a half of
g
fighting, armour units sent by the government suppressed the movement.
(Democratization)
Although the Poznan incident seems to parallel the earlier Pi 1 sen and 
East Berlin examples, it differed significantly because of the context with­
in which 1t occurred and the regime's response to it. Indeed, Poznan explod­
ed at a time when Poland was In the midst of a political "thaw". At the 
time, Intelligentsia clubs were common throughout Poland and were vocal in 
their call for reform. Needless to say, in the face of strong winds favor­
ing reform, Poland's leadership was faced with a tough decision: "The Party's
choice was quite clear. It could either maintain its allegiance to Moscow
"10
and face a full-scale revolution, or place itself at the helm of reform.
Before evaluating the leadership's decision, a more detailed examination of the 
political context within which it was made would be beneficial.
To begin with, as late as 1953»Poland's dependence on Moscow was all but 
complete. Poland's situation might best be described by the statements of a
16
former Polish Security official, Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo, a hiqhlv posi­
tioned member of the Ministry for Public Security:
Poland is ruled exclusively by Moscow. . . The general poli­
tical line Is established by conferences in Moscow. They used to 
be presided over by Stalin, ''ow by Malenkov. Some ocher members 
of the Soviet Politburo are present. Generally it is Bierut who 
goes to Moscow to gbt th* instructions, often he is accompanied 
by Berman and Mine. Mbwiver Bierut is the onlv recioient of the 
fundamental political decisions. But political only. Military 
decisions which concern working out of army olans are sent direct­
ly to Rokossowski from the Soviet General Staff.
Nothing can happen in Poland which would be contrary to 
Moscow's will, and the entire mechanism of state life is reoulated 
in the most minute details by the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet 
Union. . . The whole complex of Poland's oolitical and economic 
life is caught in the iron tongs of control wnich are held in the 
hands of the Ministry of Public Security. The squeeze is exerted 
by a group of Soviet advisors, so called, headed by the chief ad­
viser, General Lai in. 11
The dark shadow of Moscow's oppression gradually faded from over Poland 
in the aftermath of several key events. First, the execution of Soviet secret 
police chief Beria resulted in a loss of direction forPoland's Ministry of 
Public Security. More importantly, however, Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo (the 
Important security offical mentioned above) defected to the West upon hearinq 
of Berla's fate. Among Swiatlo's many duties, the supervision of Poland's 
communist leadership was the most important. In this position, Swiatlo was 
privy to the most sensitive information available in the country. Moreover, 
the arrest of Gomulka, Spychalski, and other oolitical targets was carried
out by Swiatlo. In liqht of changing events in Moscow, Swiatlo headed West
12
before suffering a fate similar to Beria's.
Once in the West, Swiatlo divulged shocking information concerning the
excesses of Party officials and the Ministry of Public Security. Soon after, 
Poles also became aware of this Information via the airwaves of Radio Free
1?
Europe. Confronted with an angered public and with its back to the wait* 
the Polish Party leaders publicly implicated the Bezoieka as the culorit 
behind the entire affair. In following up on this avenue* the Polish Polit- 
bureau discharged Radkiewicz (the head of the Ministry of Public Security)
— as well as arrestinq, and expelling form the Party, several of his closest 
associates. The shake-up of the security apparatus that followed Radkiewicz's 
dismissal effectively stripped the secret police of much of their power. Con­
sequently, a new atmosphere evolved as the threat of terror faded. The road
13to political relaxation and a milieu of liberalization was now open.
(The Rise of Intellectual Opposition)
Following the decline of the secret police's power, several significant 
developments transpired. In early 1954* the Polish Communist Party, apparently 
emulating a policy evolving in Moscow, sanctioned some criticism of itself. 
Notably, Zycie literackie carried commentaries reproving the strict censoring 
of literary works. The general policy seemed to hinge on the idea of a con­
trolled “thaw1’ in the political climate. In describing this development*
Finkelsztajn of the Central Committee stated: "'The Thaw' is a revolution
14
directed from above and supported from below."
Despite the expectations of the Party leadership, "The Thaw" was anything 
but controlled once It staged. Writers, suffering from internal guilt at hav­
ing compromised their art in order to spread half-truths, criticized the regime 
with increasing frequency and can dor. Furthermore, it didn't take long for the 
criticism to spread from issues of censorship to the system itself. In his 
1955 work "Poem for Adults", Adam Wazyk gave a scathing appraisal of Soviet-
IS
style Socialism. 15
At the same time that the Party's Writers' Union was vocalizing its 
displeasure with Party censorshio, intelligentsia clubs eme-ged as an im­
portant factor in the oolitical equation. During the Stalinist period, 
critics of the regime faced serious punishment for their views. Hence, 
candid discussions only occurred amona the closest of friends in small ori- 
vate meetinns known as prywatki. In the increasingly liberal atmosohere
of Poland following the curbinn of the Secret Police, the prywatki expanded
16
into intelligentsia clubs.
The first such intel 1 inentsia club was the Krzywe koj_o Club '’named after 
the Warsaw street on which the croup's meetinq place was located). Initially, 
the qrouo consisted of professionals from a variety of fields,and the main 
focus of discussions centered on cultural matters. Nevertheless, as a mat­
ter of course, governmental policies gained increasing importance as a topic 
for debate. Eventually, the enthusiasm of the oroup orew to such nroportions 
that regularly scheduled meetings were decided upon as well as expanding the
17
size of the qrouo.
Surprisingly, local government authorities looked favorably on the activi­
ties of the Krzywe Kolo Club and even provided a public meeting place for its 
ever-expanding membership. With the public surfacing of the Krzvwe Kolo Club 
in 1955, Club formation quickly began spreading and was significantly aided by 
Pp Prostu's (the young Party intellectuals' journal) publishing of an appeal 
for a nationwide club movement. As the club movement grew, Po °rostu and Nowy
Hurt (the internal paper of Krzvwe Kolocoordinated efforts and communications 
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between clubs.
Although a varietv of clubs developed, their main functions centered
on either Increasing their members1 awareness of contemporary issues or
actively entering the community to provide needed services. Thus, KrzywfKoloj:
first fm m  1 debate focused on the aforementioned work '‘A Poem for Adults*' by
Adam Wizyk. Later discussions covered all asoects of the resolutions passed
at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In addition, several clubs interested
in community activity initiated legal and medical advisory services, whereas
19
others contributed expertise in the planning of various projects.
Inevitably, the intelligentsia clubs collided with middle-echelon Party 
officials anxious about the potential threat cosed by the c 1 ut>s. Nevertheless, 
several clubs joined together in May 1956 to *orm a central organization known 
as the National Center of Inter-Club Cooperation, headquartered in Warsaw* St# 
fore long»the club movement received official recognition and gained subport 
from the Polish National Front. Nowy Nurt soon came under the direction of
the National Center*and funding for the Center's June Congress was provided by
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the National Front.
Although official blessinq resulted in some monetary benefits for the 
clubs, such recognition did not come without strings. Apparently, efforts 
were made to fuse the clubs into a mass organization, the result of which 
would effectively wipe out club independence from Party organs. Furthermore, 
accusations of elitism were sporadically leveled against the clubs, Club rep re 
sentatives, however, quickly defended their position on grounds that true dis­
cussion could not occur in large groups.
Club indignation was steadfastly supported by the writers as "the Polish 
press ardently defended the cause of the clubs' autonomy and particularity,
condemning not only petty harassment but attempts to turn the clubs into
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official regime organs." *n sum-, the actions of the Polish intelligentsia 
cl libs and writers contributed to greater public awareness of the issues of 
the day, mutual supoort within the societv, and a focusing of public opinion 
on matters of reform.
(Split Within the Communist Party)
It is within this context of increased political relaxation, intelli­
gentsia leadership, and economic stagnation that one must view the Polish 
leaderships post-Poznan alternatives of either towing the Moscow line at the 
cost t ) f a revolution or heading the reform effort. Initially, the Polish 
leadership was split between the hardliners and those favorina reform. In 
Julyf matters came to a head at the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Central 
ComiNttee, The siding of First Secretary Ochab and Premier Cyrankiewicz
With the progressive faction led to a complete reevaluation of Party oollcy
22and leniency for those involved in the Poznan uprising.
Although deciding upon a new course at the Seventh Plenum, the Party,
because of its damaged public image, did not have the sway to implement
changes. As a result, the Party called upon Wladyslaw Gomulka to join the
leadership. Gomulka, a lifetime advocate of autonomy for the Polish Com-
munish Party and Polish independence in developing Socialism, was imprisoned
(along with many of his associates) during the Stalin era on charges of "devi
ation". In the aftermath of the Swiatlo affair, he was released from prison,
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though he was kept politically isolated. With the situation in Poland on 
the verge of explosion, the Party called for Gomulka's return to power, even
at the price of accepting his reform proaram.
Despite the victory of Party progressives, the hardliners (known as 
the Natolin group)mounted a campaign to prevent Gomulka from assuminq the 
post of First Secretary. Various conspiracies were hatched by the Natolin 
group*and the potential use of Sovlet-supoorted force loomed large. However, 
the progressives managed to remove several hardliners from their positions, 
secure the support of the Internal Security Corps by installing General 
Vaclav Komar (a Gomulka supporter) as its head, and enlist the aid of workers.
The workers, well-informed because of the activities of intellectuals and
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students, organized councils and mirtias in support of reform.
The final showdown between reformers and hardliners occurred at the 
Eighth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee, October 19- 
21. A Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev arrived on the first day. The 
Soviets, hoping to stem reform and maintain their influence in the Polish 
Politbureau and military, pressured the Polish leadership while initiating 
Soviet troop movements as a means of intimidation. In the face of an ominous 
threat from the Soviets and Polish hardliners, the Polish people, particular­
ly the workers, moved to support the reformers. The Szczecin-Gdansk Regional 
Service later commended the efforts of the workers:
The broadcast went on to explain how the awakened workers 
protected the process of change. They met secretly with the 
Gomulka group, in private homes. Thursday night, on the eve of 
the fateful Plenum, the workers obtained a list o*f some seven 
hundred persons--members of tKe Gomulka group on the Central Com­
mittee and 1n the government, Party leaders among the Zeran workers 
and leading IntellectuaIs— who were allegedly to be arrested by the 
A m y  at the instigation of the Natolin group. The workers warned 
all those on the 11st, mounted guard over some of them, preoared 
pamphlets urging the Army to cooperate with the Gomulka group, and 
sent emissaries throughout Poland to talk to workers and soldiers.
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When, on Friday the 19th, threateninn trooo movements beoan, 
these workers reported them immediately to the Central Com­
mittee facing the Soviet leaders. 27
With the overwhelming support of the Polish people, the progressives secured 
Gomulka's return to power in the face of Soviet intimidation. Gomulka's 
ascendancy marked the beginning of major reforms and, thus, Poland had its 
bloodless revolution.
(Overview of Reforms)
Later, in the section detailing the events giving rise to the Polish 
upheaval of 1970, a general analysis of the ultimate effectiveness of Gomul­
ka's reforms will be presented. For now, however, a brief outl’ne of the 
more major changes will suffice. First, Party and government personnel 
changes occurred from the highest echelons to the lowest administrative 
branches. Second, Soviet officers holding key positions throughout the 
Polish Military (including Marshal Rokossowski, Defense Minister and Command­
er-In-Chief of the Polish Army) were removed and replaced by Poles. Third,
the Polish Youth organization was disbanded and supplanted by the Revolution-
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ary Youth Union. Fourth, participation in agricultural collectives became 
voluntary, and many existing cooperatives were permitted to dissolve. Finally, 
the Trade Union Council leadership was dismissed, and a new emphasis on better 
worker representation emerged. On 22 November, Trybuna Ludu published a reso­
lution reached at a Council meeting:
Trade unions must become fully Independent, on all levels, 
from the State and the economic administration. In their further 
development, they must base their work on the best traditions of 
the Polish trade union movement of the prewar and earliest post­
war years.
The trade union organization on all levels must be 
based on fully democratic princip'es. . . the control of 
the masses over the activities of trade union organs and 
full responsibility before the masses on the part of lead­
ing trade union authorities.
The relations between the Party and the trade unions 
must be based on the principle of....Party leadership in 
the trade union movement. . .All forms and methods of ad­
ministrative influence of Party organs upon the trade unions' 
work must be eliminated. 29
Striving to increase worker input, the government passed a law establishing
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workers councils, althouqh their precise functions were not enumerated.
In general, the regime could do very little to quickly alleviate the 
economic mess confronting the country. The Polish media criticized the many 
problems of the system and gave particular emphasis to two noted economists: 
Stefan Kurowski and Edward Lipinski (of recent KOR fame). Both men attacked 
the disproportionate development of the eocnomy and the neglect of agricul­
ture. As Rcowski fumed:
What was the determining factor which caused the 
maintenance of identical investment proportions in countries 
drastically different from one another? The scheme of a uni­
form investment structure was forced upon these countries by 
the doctrinaire dogmas of Stalinism, which held that Socialist 
economy could develop according to one model only. The dogmas 
of Stalinism violated the individuality of individual countries, 
they abused rational economic proportions, caused terrific eco­
nomic tensions within these countries— all this in order to sat­
isfy the Stalinist theory of increased tempo in industrialization. 31
Surprisingly, both men called for foreign aid from the West and oointed out 
that many lessons could be learned from Capitalism. Finally, with the ex­
ception of agriculture where nearly 80 percent of the collective farms disbanded, 
massive economic changes were not quick in coming. The leadership did tamper 
with new wage schemes, relax certain agricultural and industrial practices, and 
reduce various taxes, but all such practices only touched the tip of the iceberg.
(Conclusions)
In summation, the events in Poland in 1956 culminated in a bloodless 
revolution. A major shift in power transpired and many reforms were ini­
tiated— >a11 with Moscow's initial disapproval. Two glaring elements dif­
ferentiating Poland's successful revolution from the spontaneous and easi­
ly subdued uprisings of Pilsen and East 3er1in include: 1) an increased
atmosphere of liberalization ("The Thaw") accompanied by the emergence of 
progressive Party elements and 2) the emergence of intel1inentsia clubs 
and vocal Party writers who increased public awareness and solidified re­
form sentiments. Thus, although all three shared the element of economic 
difficulties, only Poland maintained the political and social context for 
major reform. As will be discussed in the section on 1970 Poland, Gomulka 
did reverse most of his reforms upon consolidating power. However, Gomulka 
could only have accomplished such a reversal because of the Polish people's 
misplaced faith in him. Later examination of the events of 1970 Poland 
will demonstrate that the people's faith in and tolerance of Gomulka were 
not limitless.
Hungary (The flew Course and Rakosi's Demise)
The early seeds of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 may be found in the 
events surrounding the implementation and eventual reversal of the New Course 
When Malenkov assumed power in the Soviet Union and instituted the New Course 
(1953), Hungary was under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi, a true Stalinist. 
Although Moscow's policy of collective leadership received only cosmetic ad­
herence in most East bloc nations, the principle achieved true meaning in 
Hungary.. Rakosi was called to Moscow and castigated for his past economic
practices. In addition, the progressive Imre Naay assumed the premiership
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and headed the new economic program.
Nagy inherited an economy suffering from many of the same ills previous­
ly described 1n Poland. Rakosl had zealously Pursued a program of forced 
Industrialization, emphasizinq heavy industry and neqlectinq consumer pro­
duction. Moreover, under Rakosi's stewardship, economic planning geared 
for higher and higher production levels in what amounted to an almost mad- 
denlnq upward spiral. Tremendous strains developed in the economy and the 
country's resources were grossly mishandled. As Naoy pointed out in a dis­
sertation to the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Conrnittee:
One of the serious consequences of too rapid industrializa- 
tion undertaken without regard for national resources was that 
it developed Industries for which basic materials were lacking 
in Hungary and neglected or even restricted those industries 
which 'were based on Hungarian resources and basic materials.
As a result, industrial development required more and more im­
ported basic and raw materials and we acquired these on ever 
less favorable terms. 34
With Nagy at the helm a more rational plan of develooment evolved--one which 
sought to stem the many privations affUctinq the Hungarian people.
Another ruthless Rakosl policy deeply concerning Nagv Involved the pro­
gram of forced collectivization. Through various cruel methods including 
land seizure, taxation, crop requisition and denial of credit, fertilizer, 
and otherntcessities, the Rakosi regime forced oeasants into collectives.
Such harsh policies only resulted in peasant hatred, a reluctance to work, and 
lower agricultural production, Nagy planned to abolish such adversive prac­
tices; unfortunately, in the aftermath of his announcement, peasants disbanded 
many collectives and divided the collective property among themselves. 3ecause
peasant actions occurred at the end of the orowing season and threatened
to interrupt harvesting, Nagy's government reluctantly moved against the
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peasants and conflicts ensued.
In an effort to reach out to the people directly, Nagy promised to 
curb the abuses of the secret police, disband internment C3mps, and release 
various political prisoners. In addition, the government licensed an assort­
ment of small businesses in hooes of increasing goods and services. Under 
the new policy, the status and treatment of intellectuals and professional 
people improved. In sum, Nagy's proqram created great enthusiasm through­
out the country and promoted an atmosphere of increased liberalization and 
trust.
During the entire time that Nagy developed and implemented his policies, 
Rakosi did everything possible to undermine them. Although no longer in favor 
with Moscow, Rakosi nevertheless continued in the post of Party First Secre- . 
tary and maintained close ties with his supporters in the Hungarian Communist 
Party. When Nagy collided with the peasants over the rapid disbanding of 
collectives, Rakosi quietly spread rumors of Naqy's threat to the system. 
Eventually, a split 1n the leadership developed between Nagy and his Communist 
intellectual and bureaucratic supporters an^fakosi and his orthodox party 
followers.'*"
As Malenkov's position weakened in Moscow, Nagy came under fire too. Af 
ter summoning Nagy to Moscow, Malenkov (the original reformer) chastised the 
Hungarian leader for hlfcpolicies. Although Nagy's prestige suffered followii 
the Soviet reprimM0^Snd slipped still further after Malenkov's removal^ tftd 
Premier'! potltWh received A critical Mftw whet) Nagy fell victim to a deary
attack in January 1955, While Nagy recovered from his illness, Rafcosi
energetically sought to strip him of all pov^K In early March, responding
to the Rakosi campaign, the Central Committee censored Nagy. The following
month, the Central Committee removed Nagy from all Party oosts while the
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Parliament droopecIhipr^s Premier.'
Despite fW^'s removal and the elevation of Rakosi suonorters, Rakosi's
„  . . .
power.r^mained limited. Undoubtedly, Rakosi's identification with Stalinism
^we i g h e d  heavily against him in Khrushchev's eyes. Furthermore, those Com­
munists released from orison and returned to political life under Nagy's 
direction remained dedicated to his cause and were joined by manv novernnental 
bureaucrats. The general oooulation, remembering oast hardshiDS, also ooposed 
a return to Rakosi's previous practices. The most vocal onoosition, however, 
centered around Communist intellectuals who led the onoosition and call for 
reform. The significance of their contribution will now be examined.
(The Writers' Union)
Before the rise of Nagy and the New Course, Party writers concentrated 
their efforts on supporting regime policy. The sterility and repressiveness 
of Rakosi's regime actively discouraged literature written for ourely artistic 
reasons. A writer's success in society depended on writing simole and direct 
praises of the Communist Party, and nonconformists suffered intense criticism 
from fellow colleagues. So intense was the reoime's control over writers’ 
thoughts and actions, that many writers were induced to write ( and actually
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believe) the regime's trumped-up charges against associates and even friends.
When in June of 1953 the Communist Party's Central Committe condemned the ore- 
vious Party policies and practices, the writers, strinoed of the cause to
23
which they had devoted all their energies, discovered the immense and ugly
delusion with which they had deceived themselves. Recognizing the Party's
deterioration into a stagnant and repressive force, a slide to which they
had contributed, the writers sought to make amends by preaching renewal and
riform. In Nagy and the policies of the flew Course the writers saw an od-
portunitv to invigorate the Party and, thereby, reach some decree of inner
peace. In the words of one writer: "the trouble lies not in what 1 said,
but in what I did not say: the whole truth". As will be discussed later,
the fall of Nagy and return of Rakosi created a situation wnere the writers
4?
were put to the test.
The earliest criticisms forwarded by the writers emerged shortly after 
Nagy's rise to power. Peter Kuczka's Nyirseg Diary, a stirring poetical ac­
count <»f thecollective farm disturbances, first appeared in Irodalini Ujsag 
on November 7, 1953. The poem decries the sufferings of the peasants,as ex­
emplified by an old lady, and holds the Party responsible:
Comrade, have you noticed this little old woman in the northern 
villages,
where the sky does not carry the smoke of factories, 
where the railroad does not thunder and there is still 
no electricity? 43
The stir caused by the poem resounded throughout the Communist hierarchy and 
literary circles, and despite the denounciations of middle echelon officials, 
unorthodox critical essays appeared in Ujltanq and Csi1 lag, two literary 
journals.
Kuczka's poem marked wily the beginning of the soon to come literary 
flood. Following Nagy's amnesty for political prisoners, the horrible details
of Rakosi's brutal practices surfaced. As Kecskemti points out: "These
confrontations plunged the Connunlst Intellectual- Into aoonles of remorse
and despair: the noems and articles they had written durinq the period of
terror, applauding Rakosl and vilifying his victims, remained as monuments
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to their shame." In the aftermath of the political prisoner release, the 
tempo of writings increased, but when compared to the events following Nagy's 
fall and the CPSU's Twentieth Congress, the atmosphere was more like the lull 
before the storm.
Nagy's fall and the demise of the New Course stirred the writers to ac­
tion. Initially, Party writers within the Writers' Union attempted to onen 
the leadership's eyes to the undercurrent of reform sentiment present in 
society but were unsuccessful. The leadership assailed the writers, prevent­
ed the printing of an edition of Irodalmi l),1sag. and fired the paper's edi­
tor. In response to Party actions, the writers drew up a memorandum de­
crying Party tampering with cultural matters and cited various Party resolu­
tion! 1n suoport of their position. The regime reacted with more scathing at- 
tacks agaipst the writers and forced many supporters to withdraw their siqna-
turei, Nevertheless, despite Party exertion of pressure and efforts at co-
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aptatiofl, several writers held stead:eat,
The full-scale explosion of 1iterar, criticism appeared on the heels of 
CPSU's Twentieth Ceff#re$s. Up until tn«t Mme, the Party writers had menaqed 
to Steve pft thf leadership's assaults py utilizing the clout that Party 
Wtmpfrtftip Iffofdfl Wiruihtnpy's sent* at the Congress, ham w , pro­
vided the ammunition for a counter a t t a ­
in denouncing the "cylt of the personality" and ooHtigal purges, the
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Soviet leader lef* Rakosi exposed to c :ticism ‘'•'■mi all sides. Moreover,
the new Soviet liiu also . rt ented Rakr from moving jqainst his critics,
leaving him practically helpless. The consequences of Rakosi's lame duck
position and intense writer criticism became evident as the leaderships
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authority eroded, clearing the way for the October Revolution.
(The Petofi Circle)
A second intellectual organization, more volatile and anti-Rakosi in
its outlook, was the Petofi Circle. The Petofi Circle *is formed in 1955 bv
young intelligentsia and constituted a branch of the Connunist youth organi- 
49zation DIS2. Many of its leaders had suffered imprisonment under Rakosi
and were released under Naqy's direction. As Pal Jonas, last President of
the Petofi Circle, bitterly recounted:
. . .  We scraped at the ground with our fingers; we du« iwSes 
with bits of wood; we staqqered with boulders oouched a*sei*st 
out stomachs. Day by day our situation deteriorated. Dis­
couragement set in, ana many of us qave up all hone of life.
It was, indeed, a "death car®"; for years only the dead issued 
forth. 50
Maintaining the memory of such brutal experiences, the Petofi members oushed 
for reform.
Threeth their actions, the Petofi members hoped to provide a forum, much 
like kr|ywf Kalo in Poland, for increasing public awareness and stimulating 
debate. The club's focus sought to unroot past problems and forward new views 
For its efforts, the Petofi Circle received a major boost from the "Thaw" pro­
claimed at the Twentieth Congress 6f the Connunist Party of the Soviet Union. 
In describing the Petofi Circle and the imoortance of the Soviet Congress, Pal 
Jonas stated:
. « . It [the Fete** Circle] troitid a f en* *he#e» for the first
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time, the Important problems of the nation could be freely 
discussed, where faults and failures were attributed to their 
real causes, and where the members could speak from their 
hearts, not merely parroting what the Party wanted them to 
say. The intellectuals who made uo the Circle Dreoared and 
created the climate for the uprising of people of all classes 
and backgrounds against the Communist rulers.
[and]
. . . Indeed It was the liberalizing forces released by this 
Congress which provided the Circle with its opportunity to 
prepare the country for democratization, a task which should 
have been taken on by the Party itself. 51
Thus, the Petofi Circle struck forward to aaitate for change.
A major turning point for the Petofi Circle was its debate on the Soviet 
Congress and its relation to the Hungarian economy in May of 1956. At the 
forum Rakosi and his policies were severely criticized. Among the more 
objectionable practices were forced industrialization, agricultural mismanage­
ment and ruthlessness, misdirection of the economy, and a lack of reform in 
the Five Year Plan. Demands were voiced for revision of the Five Year Plan,
valid statistical information, a pricing system move In line with reality,
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and Increased wages.
The next major stir caused by the Circle's activities sprang out of a
June forum on partisans and freedom fighters. The fireworks beqan when the
rehabilitated wife of Laszlo Rajk (a Rakosi purge victim) spoke. Mrs. Rajk
did not mince words as she addressed Party officials in attendance:
You not only killed my husband but you killed all decency in 
our country. You destroyed Hungary's political, economic, 
and moral life. Murderers cannot be rehabilitated: they 
must be punished. 53
Mrs. Rajk's appearance in defense of her husband and in opposition to the 
regime caused a tremendous sensation throughout the country and promoted 
greater anti-Rakosi hostility.
Initially, the Rakosi regime hesitated in bringing action against the
32
Petofi Circle. As previously expressed, Moscow’s new line against such 
actions definitely weighed as an inhibiting factor —  though some contend 
that Rakosi oermitted the Circle's activities in order to more clearly iden-
5a
tify his opposition before dealing with it. Whatever the reason, Rakosi
began to run into increasing trouble and his attitude changed:
Rakosi was now, and with great reason, becoming increasingly 
determined to stop the run-away development of the Petofi 
Circle as a center of mass agitation against his reqime, the 
more so since its main political aim was now clearly his re­
moval and because the ferment it generated did not remain con­
fined to the youth and intelligentsia, but was now beoinning 
to soread among the workers. 55
Apparently, Rakosi planned (without success) to divide the workers and peas­
ants from their intellectual leaders by producing economic rewards for the 
former and moving aqalnst the latter.
Matters came to a head in the wake of the Petofi Circle's press debate 
held on the evening of dune 27. During the session, at which a huge crowd 
was present, many prominent writers directly and bitterly attacked the Rakosi 
regime. Three Central Committee members attended and were hounded endlessly 
as the meeting carried on into the earlv morning. Of particular importance, 
physicist Ujos Janossy, head of the state atmonic enerqv commission, openly 
questioned Soviet exoloitation of Hungary's uranium fields:
. . .  Recently, when we went to Moscow to confer with our Soviet 
colleagues, it turned out that they knew considerably more about 
the Hunferlan uranium fields than we did. We knew next to nothing 
about them, but our Soviet col leagues were kind enough to put some 
of the data at our disposal. 58
The uranium issue enraged the Hungarian populace and became an important focal 
point of anti-Soviet sentiments; indeed, an end to uranium exploitation was 
a major economic demand arising out of the October upheaval.^
Responding to the Petofi Circle's debate, Rakosi removed Tardos and 
Dery (two of the most vocal anti-regime writers) from the Communist Party, 
denounced the Petofi Circle with an assortment of Communist rhetorical
33
slurs, and initiated an unsuccessful camoainn to incite the workers aqainst 
the Circle. Despite Rakosi's actions, defiance continued,and the Writers 
Union rejected Tardos and Dery's expulsion. Distrust of the regime spread 
throughout the factories, particularly in light of Laszlo Ra.jk's (Rakosi's 
purged opponent) rehabilitation. Although temporarily stunned, the Petofi
Circle eventually reappeared. As the situation continued to deterioriate,
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Rakosi's removal became inevitable.
(Nagy's Return and the Outbreak of Fiohting)
Under heavy pressure from the Soviets, Rakosi resigned in mid-July and 
was succeeded by his right-hand man, Erno Gero. Althouch outwardly consilia- 
tory toward the reform opposition, Gero implemented no real reforms and only 
attempted to stabilize the situation (To this end he permitted the reemernence 
of the Petofi Circle.). As Gero's pandaqing operation slowly unravelled, a 
process hastened by Irodalini U.isag's articles on the princely lifestyle of 
the Party's highest echelon, the leadership decided to rehabilitate Imre Nagy
(apparently with Moscow's approval).
On October 4, Nagy was readmitted to the Party althouqht not to any of­
ficial position. Two days later, an official ceremonial reburial of Laszlo 
Rajk and several other purge victims occurred, notably without uniformed AVH 
(secret police) agents present. As the power of the regime continued its de­
cline. numerous student organizations broke with the Comnunist-controlled
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OISZ (a student federation).
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In mid-October, the emboldened students decided to hold a demonstration 
In the caoital in support of Poland's reform movement. News of the planned 
demonstration spread quickly, and students from a technological university 
drew up a list of sixteen demands focusing on more equitable Hungarian- 
Soviet relations, the establishment of a Democracy under the guidance of Nagy, 
and a restoration of personal freedoms. Although initially banning the 
demonstration, the leadership finally submitted, and on 22 October the 
march took place with a crowd in the hundreds of thousands. The demonstra­
tors eventually halted their procession outside the Parliament Suildino where
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student demands were read and Nagy spoke.
On the evening of the demonstration, First Secretary Gero addressed 
the nation. His speech, void of any indication of bowing to reform, embit­
tered the people--particular1y 1n liqht of Gomulka's rise to power in Poland.
In the absence of a Soviet military intervention in Poland, many Hungarians 
probably believed similar caution would be accorded to Hungarian developments. 
Angered by Gero's speech and emboldened by Polish events, demonstrators toppled 
Stalin's statue— the removal of which was a student demand. Attempting to in­
crease publicity for their reforms, several students converged on the Radio 
Building seeking to have their demands read over Budapest Radio. A student del­
egation entered the building, and a large crowd formed outside. A long wait 
ensued without any word. Suddenly, the AVH (secret police) fired tear gas
grenades and bullets into the crowd. A battle for the station followed, and
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the Hungarian Revolution began.
As news of the radio station incident spread, fighting broke out in several 
areas throughout Budaoest. The battles that ensued pitted workers, students, 
intellectuals, and sympathetic military and regular police forces against the
brutal AVH and Soviet reinforcements. During several days of fighting,
Revolutionary Workers* Councils formed and usurped power from Communist
functionaries. Ultimately, Imre Nagy emeroed at the head of a provisional
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government and called for a cease fire.
Among Nagy‘s first actions was the disbanding of the Avh and the on#* 
party system. As Soviet forces withdrew f**om Budapest, the freedom fight­
ers consolidated into a National Guard, and Lieutenant General Pal ^aleter, 
a decisive leader in the revolution, became Minister of Defense. Just as 
the machinery for a new system based on socialism and democrac/ developed, 
news of Soviet troop movements across the border arrived.
On November 1, Nagy threatened to declare neutrality a Soviet with* 
drawal was not forthcoming. When news of larger troop crossings reached the 
Hungarian leadership later that evening, Nagy announced Hungary’s Declaration 
of Neutrality, Although a Hungarian delegation had been negotiating with the 
Soviets for a troop withdrawal, Soviet agents arrested the Hungarians just 
prior to the second Soviet intervention. The Hungarians fougnt courageously 
against the returning Soviet forces but fell victim to super'or numoers and 
firepower. Through deceit and brute force, the Soviets secured Nagy's ar­
rest and installed a favorable government under their puppet Ketfar
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Thus, the Hungarian Revolution was crushed.
(Conclusions)
In reviewing the Polish and Hungarian movements, one discovers several 
close parallels. To begin with, both countries experience some liberaliza­
tion after the initiation of the flew Course and the subsequent curbing of 
the secret police. Secondly, both countries Suffered from economic difficult
ties not remedied in the aftermath of the *lew Course* particularly after 
the program’s reversal. Finally, the development of inteliigentsia clubs 
and vocal Writers' Unions within both contributed to increased public a- 
wareness and a rallying of reform sentiments. However, an important dif­
ference does exist; namely, elements of the Old-Guard Polish leadership 
recognized the need to transfer Dower to a more nuol'cl/ acceptable n
and, therefore, sided with progressive elements. Ac a result, GomuU.a came 
to power despite the threat of the %!atol in Group and, thus, armed conflict 
was averted.
In Hungary, however, orthodox elements clung to t ne ; r nos it on i n the 
face of ever mounting public criticism. The orovocati ve and brutal actions 
of the AVH merely constituted the oaten whi n set the situation on fire.
IV. Czechoslovakia 1968: Socialism with a Human "ace
Affect of the New Course and the CPSiJ's Twentieth Congress
PresSored bv the Malenkov leadership to *o1low its newly developed 
policy and jolted by the Pi Hen uprising, the dual Zaootocky-Novotny leader­
ship in Czechoslovakia adopted some Mew Course measures. The new plan re­
duced intensive industrialization and forced collectivization and permitted 
some collectives to dissolve. 'Moreover, consumer goods production, ior- 
cultural investment, and light industry development received greater pri­
ority. Although paying official lip service to its reforms, the Czech Hai- 
•rship pursued the new policies unenthusiastically and gradually permitted 
their erosion.
The erosion of economic reforms, coupled with the lack of any real politi­
cal relaxation, left the Czech leadership in a hardline position going into 
CPSU's Twentieth Congress. Following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, 
the Czechoslovak Party expressed similar, though limited, sentiments. The only
concrete action arising in the Congress's aftermath was the removal of the Mini­
ster of National Defense (Alexej Cepicka) on charges of encouraging the cult of
2
the personality.
The regime's indifference to liberalization led to April and May 1956
demonstrations in Pregee and iratislave. ehen calls for change were condamnad
by the Party, re»ent*»t m o w e d .  Tempers fj*w| ft tht A(*f11 HifldN Cflh- 
gross of Czechoslovak w rite rs  a t the regiwff MftjMviif tiVlN f t H M d i W  fhf 
in te rfe rin g  with ctrtfeirt* d f f f l f f /  ftfWtfttltyfjrt N W f  W U M M M ff lt
demands for a special Congress. Despite growing: opposition* the Party 
chiefs remained firm in their position and managed to keep a lid on 
tnlngs. As H. Gordon Skilling points out, favorable conditions aided 
the leadership's efforts:
As a result of comparatively satisfactory economic conditions, 
no serious unrest occurred among peasants and workers, as in 
Hungary and Poland, so that no simultaneous movement of pro­
test by dissenting intellectuals and the broader masses took 
place. 4
Thus lacking the key element of economic difficulties,Intellectuals were 
handicapped in arcusing mass support and eventually failed under govern­
mental pressure.
3
The Economic Turn-of-Events
Over the next several years,as Novotny continued orthodox economic poli­
cies, the favorable economic conditions preventing solidfied opposition to 
the regime deteriorated. Despite remedial efforts at decentralization in 
the late fifties, a full-blown economic crisis emerged between 1962 and 1963. 
Up until that period, Czechoslovakia maintained a substantial growth rate by 
intensive Investment in heavy industry. The economic path chosen followed 
the principle of quantitative or "extensive" development of the means of
e
production rather than a qualitative or "intensive" program. By the early 
1960s, the Czechoslovak course of development had exhausted itself as greater 
and greater Inputs were required to maintain production rates. Between 1962-
1963 negative grcwth emerged as a consequence of neglecting technology and a
6
decreasing labor supply. Below are three charts demonstrating the declines 
in industrial production and labor productivity, as well as the siphoning off 
of agricultural ’abor:
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The entire economic mess spelled hardships for the Czechoslovak people and 
potential trouble for Novotny. Notwithstanding Initial hesitation, the 
leadership decided that the economic problems necessitated change and ap­
pointed Ota SIk to head an Economic Conmlsslon Investigating possible solu­
tions. Ultimately, Slk devised an innovative strategy to cure the nation's 
111s, but Party acceptance didn't occur until 1967. Under Slk's plan, a 
regulated market system would replace the command structure, thereby Induc­
ing an Intensive growth pattern. Increased emphasis on the oroflt motive, 
technological Innovation, reward based on merit (rather than Party loyslty) 
and enhanced competition served as Slk's principle tools to restore economl 
health, though central olannlng and regulation continued at the highest
levels of the eocnomic chain. ' 0
Despite Silt's energetic efforts, conservative and incompetent elements 
throughout the system, fearing a reduction in power and prestige, subverted 
the reforms. The economic program suffered from foot-dragging, revisions 
limiting Its scope, and the Party's reflexive Inclination to interfere.”  
Frustrated and disappointed at the entrenched resistance to change, many re- 
formers concluded that political changes needed to precede economic ones.
The Writers Union
Not having given up after 1956, the Czech and Slovak writers (formally 
tied under the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, SCSS) continued struggling for 
a general liberalization. Using their literary journals Literami noviny 
(Czech) and Kultumy zivot (Slovak), the writers pressured the regime which 
steadfastly resisted. The end result was that "The efforts of the govern­
ment to harness press, radio, and television to its ourposes and to curb the 
cultural periodicals generated bitter resistance and resulted in a deadlock
13
which contributed to the weakening of the regime and its ultimate collapse."
At the same time that the regime was suffering its economic setbacks, 
boldness within literary circles Increased. The writers, through their jour­
nals, developed a network uniting intellectuals. In early 1963, at both the 
Slovak and Czech Writers' Congresses, criticisms of the system and Party in­
terference reached unprecedented levels. Rather than attempting to appease
the writers, Novotny and associates lashed back with bitter denounciatlons
. . . , i a
and reiterations of the Party's leading role.
During the latter part of 1963, the regime orchestrated a campaign re­
proaching the media 1n general and the writers in spedfie. Unswayed, the
42
writers maintained their demands; Laco Novomesky's request for "absolute
freedom of exoresslon for writers to the qreatest deqree possible" accented
11
the Prevalent outlook. When pressure failed, the regime took overt action—  
shak1ng-uo editorial boards, the Union leadership, the Central Committee's 
Ideological Department and ultimately shutting-down Tvar (the young writers' 
periodical).1®
In 1966, the Party leadership again provoked the writers by nassinq a 
new press law. The law legitimized Party censorshiD and siqnaled e ressser- 
tion of Party intervention. When the Union of Writers held their Fourth 
Congress 1n June 1967, the "loves came off as vehement ridicule of Party 
policy was expressed. Pavel Kohout's deriding of Czech Middle East policy, 
Ivan Klima's arid Antonin liehm's belittling of censorship, Milan Kundera’ 
hailing of the country's democratic past, Jan Prochazka's calls for Increased 
freedom, and Ludvik Vaculik's biting analysis of the effects of oower high-
17
lighted the session.
The regime's anger over the writers' actions manifested itself not only 
in denounciations but in reprisals. Jan Benes, a Czech writer, was sentenced 
to orison for providing Pavel Tigvid (a Czech journalist in the We-c) with 
information; Ladlslav Mnacko, a highly decorated writer, was stripoed of 
citizenshiD and removed from the Party (while in Israel); Vaculik, Liehm, 
and Klima also were dumped by the Party; and Literarni noviny fell under the 
control of the Ministry of Culture (receiving a reduction in paper alloca- 
tion). Thus, the hostility between Novotny and the writers became irrecon­
cilable and continued until the First Secretary's fall from oower.
Youth and Student Opposition
Dissatisfaction with the Novotny regime also surfaced among Czechoslo­
vakia's youth, particularly students. In May 1968, young people from through­
out Prague and of all occupations marched to Karel Hynek dacha's statue 1n 
Petrln park and payed homage to the deceased poet. The march, though Initial­
ly peaceful, erupted Into a demonstration with Dartlcipants calling for demo­
cracy and an end to comnunlsrn. Several arrests were made and twelve people
19
received jail sentences 'rom five to seventeen months.
As a whole, the country's youth became Increasingly agitated, and the 
students cultivated a unique movement. The first seeds of student dissent 
appeared In 1963 as Prague University students organized Informal associations. 
By 1966, the student leader J1r1 Muller was agitating for reform of the 
Ctechoslovak Union of Youth (CSM). At a student conference Muller proposed 
Union federation according to age and occupational criteria. He also advo­
cated political Involvement for older students— golno as far as suggestions
20
of opposition to the Conmunlst Party. Muller's efforts did not go un­
noticed, and he soon received hi* university release, youth organization ex­
pulsion, and draft notice. Although Muller's friend Lubos Holecek took up
the fight. Party officials were unmoved and dealt with Holecek 1n a similar 
21manner.
The uncompromising attitude of the leadership merely served to unite 
student opposition, particularly as regards the stagnant youth organization.
At the Union's fifth Congress 1n June of 1967, Novotny affirmed Party control 
over the student organization and stressed continued non-fragmentation. In 
addition, Muller's suggestions and actions received public condemnation. As
44
a result, students became further disillusioned with the authorities and In 
October 1967, matters caMeto a head. Difficulties first arose when students 
from Prague's Strahov dormitories, angered by frequent power outages, gathered 
outside their residences and began a protest march. The candlellqht orocesslon 
soon met police resistance and a confrontation took place. The police dis­
persed the students, but they returned foil owlno nevsof three arrests. The
second encounter turned into a brawl as twelve students and three policemen
22
required medical attention.
Angered by police excesses and biased media reporting of the incident,
students joined in demands calling for official exoneration of student actions,
objective media coverage, and police reprimands. By oermittinq the stuciants
to air grievances, the leadership demonstrated a softening of its oosition—
though government intrigues apparently were aimed at preventing the students
from agitating among the workers. As one student claimed:
. . . There have been tanoible improvements in the livinq standard 
and the government has launched a campaign promising steady imnro«'o- 
ment. The workers don't want to rock the boat now. They'll join 
us 1n 1968, when all this collapses and their oocketbooks are hit 
hard. I've done a lot of comouter-programing for the 1968 plan and 
it looks horrible. The government is in a cold sweat about it. 23
For the time being, the Novotny leadershio seemed again to have weathered the
storm; at the same time, however, the regime's grip on society anneared to be
slipping.
Dissension Within the Ranks
Mounting opposition to Novotny within intellectual and student circles 
soon spread to elements of the Comunist leadership. Durinq Central Committee 
sessions in October and December of 1967, Party divisions occurred as Novotny's
leadership and monopoly of power came under fire. Mien calls for a separa­
tion of the President's and First Secretary's functions surfaced, Novotny 
moved to forestall such a split, and various military officers conspired 
to keep him in power, forcibly if necessary. Unable to secure full military 
backing and strong support from Moscow, a politically crippled Novotny wit­
nessed h1s position weaken. During a January plenum, amidst strong contro­
versy, Novotny was dropped as First Secretary,and Alexander Dubcek was selec-
24
ted as his successor.
Dubcek's rise marked the beginning of serious efforts at reform; however, 
despite the Isolation of Novotny and certain of his associates, the Party and 
Its apparatus remained divided between conservative, moderate, and radical 
elements. Moreover, public opinion began pushing for a more raold pace of 
change, and various conflicting demands on the system emerged. Rather than 
engage In a tedious step by step account of Party 1n-fight1nq, societal demands 
on the system, and the leadership's handling of each and every problem con­
fronting It, the author will present a comorehensive surmarv of the leader­
ship's April 1968 Action Proqram— the Partv's broad outline of reform designed 
to placate the various competing factions."
The Action Program--The Makings of Revolution
One of the most significant aspects of the Action Prooram was its call 
for democratization and an end to the Communist Party's monopoly of power. 
Indeed, in speaking of the National Front (an organ consisting of various mass 
organizations and certain remnants of pre-1948 political parties), the leader­
ship claimed:
The National Front is based on the principle that socialist state
power must not be a monopoly of any single party, nor of a 
coalition of political parties. On the contrary, it must 
be accessible to all political social organizations of the 
peoole, all Unsocial, nationality and generation grouos. 
all citizens. «•
Although the proclamation stops short of calling for the formation of political 
parties. Its recognition of political-social organization's access to state 
power may be Interpreted as tacit approval for such organizations and their 
right to access on the system (such access to Incut representing some degree 
of contention with the Comnunist Party).
Furthermore, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was being billed as 
In a position whereby Its support and authority had to be earned. Hence,
the Party leadership directed its efforts toward gaining popular support
27
(which In many cases they appeared to have achieved). Deputy Premier 
Oldrlch Cernlk stated:
Democracy must be established and the task is to bring all 
the advantages of socialist democracy to life fully and 
practically. In this entire process of democratization the 
Party is In the lead and it remains the leading force In 
society, but of course that means to lead and not administer, 
much less to order about. 28
Thus, reforms in a society that Included "socialism with a human face" would 
have to encompass a new image for the Comminlst Party (though it was to remain 
the leading force at "all" times).
In conjunction with the process of democratization, the Dubcek regime also
sought reforms which would guarantee freedom of association. The extension of
freedom of association, written into the old constitution but unenforced by the
previous regime, was quickly utilized by the various political-social orgarilza- 
99
tlons. In addition, the trade union movement took advantage of the situation 
to create new unions or to create autonomous factions within established organs.
Federation of the trade union movement was also Initiated along national
lines (Czech or Slovak). Despite the existence of some opinion in favor
of totally Independent unions, the leadership decided that all unions
would remain federated under one main organization. Although this might be
viewed as a setback, the trade union rovement did achieve greater powers in
defending the interests of workers (though it also continued 1n the sphere
30
of political indoctrination). Similar developments occurred in the agri­
cultural union movement.^
Freedom of association was combined with freedom of worship as religious
groups began to reassert themselves. The Party forwarded the arqument that
32
"believers are an active part of Socialist society. . . " On the whole, 
one of the most Interesting developments regarding religion was the restora­
tion of the Catholic Church of the Old Slavonic Rite (Uniates) which continued 
to be banned in the Soviet Union. For the reform leadership, this particular 
church's links to Ukranlan Nationalism in the Soviet Union had ominous impli­
cations.^
Finally, freedom of association was utilized by various ethnic minorities 
(especially Ukranlan and Hungarian) In reorganizing or creating councils to 
present ethnic grievances. Both groups had suffered under Slovakian national 
fervor. Consequently, the reform leadership began to formulate remedial solu­
tions— Including greater representation, Increased local autonomy, and restora­
tion of rights; however, the new constitution, embodying the reforms, was
34
never completed nor implemented owina to the Soviet invasion.
Along with its proposals for freedom of association and religious worship, 
the Dubcek leadership also called for freedom of expression, speech, and press;
without which, freedom of association would be useless. Hence, the
new Press U w  was instituted to eliminate censorshio in Chechoslovakia. As
Deputy Jirina Tureckova acknowledged:
. . . the joiatmeeting of the Constitutional Legal and Cultural 
Committee of the National Assembly had agreed on the following 
formulation of the novelized Press Law: bv censorshin, we mean
any Intervention by a state body against freedom of speech and 
illustration and their dissemination through mass means of infor­
mation. 36
Coinciding with reforms on basic civil rights, the Action Program %Ho 
called for laws rectifying the persecutions of citizens (both Communist and 
non-Communist) under the previous regime, the culmination of this crusade 
was the Law on Rehabilitation. Under the new law, unjustly ounisned individu­
als would have their homes and certain other confiscated orooertie-. returned 
or would receive compensation. Similarly, compensation for losses suffered 
as a result of illegal Imprisonment would ensue. Each case was to receive 
special investigation, and final decisions were to be reached bv an independent
court. Finally, the Rahabilitation Law contained provisions for call inn to
)■*
account those individuals who directly narticipated in the persecutions.
The reforms' long-run guarantee against arbitrary newer snifts and changes 
of temperament within the Communist Party rested with the establishment if a
government and institutions not dominated by the Party. Conseguent!y, a >ena-
If
ratios of governmental organs from the Communist party was necessary. " As i
first step, the Action Program called for an increase in the powers of toe
National Assembly (the main legislative body which had acted as a rubber s'vnp
on Party policy) and for an increase in its ties to the citizenrv:
The Action Program . . . cal1[ed] for a National Assembly 
'which will truly make laws and decide important political 
questions, Mid not just approve drafts submitted to it.'
The Program advocated the strengthening of the control func­
tion of the Assemblv vis-a-vis the government (and 'all areas 
of public life'), including subordination of the control ap­
paratus, presumably the control commission, to the Assembly.
35
* 9
V#»11« the Program contained nothin*) on votes of confidence 
or public proceedinqs, It did say that the Assembly must be 
restored Its Constitutional position as the supreme organ 
of state newer and must establish closer ties with 'the public 
opinion of the citizenry'--though how It did not say. In either 
case. 39
Likewise, f« furthering the bonds of various officials to the citizenry, a
need for electoral reform arose:
the voting act had become a symbol of a person's support of 
socialism, and if one failed to turn out for the elections 
or dared to inspect the ballot-much less cross out a name 
or try to enter the uninviting booth provided— one was con­
sidered 'anti-social1st'. This whole procedure of 'forced 
voting', whereby voting was a duty rather than a right and 
turnouts of 99.9 per cent were reached, was, as Slovak 
Presidium member Hruskovlc said on television on 29 February 
19M, ’ridiculous'. 40
Because of the electoral inadequaci of the system, certain elections were
postponed until such time as a new election law could be drafted. In addition,
peateselt for a recall prevision were raised 1n hopes of making certain offi­
ll
dels mere responsible to their constituents.
Among the refoms Initiated In the area of government, perhaps none were 
If m w e  central importance than those associated with the federalization of 
country. The country's Slovak minority hoped to overcome their asymetrl-
19
eel re1ati«s to the Czech majority. Indeed, several of the chief reformers, 
tadudimg Dubctfc, were Slovaks. In a soeech before the Bratl lava City Con­
ference, Gustav Husek oroclaimed, "It 1$ now generally recognized in Czecho-
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Slovakia that a new state pattern or a federative orinclole 1s unavoidable."
According to a government coasaislon on federalization, the new system 
mwld include governmen ts in the Czech and Slovak lands which would serve 
•s executive organs while national councils in both areas would serve as 
legislative bodies. On the federal level, two legislative bodies would be
created: "the Chamber o f the People (about 200 deputies) would be composed
o f deputies elected by all electors on a representative footing, and a Cham­
ber of Nations composed on a parity basis (50-50)." ^  In other words, the 
federal system would grant the Slovaks parity representation in one body—
much like the U.S. Senate, while maintaining proportional representation 1n
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another— similar to the U.S. House of Representatives. Czechoslovakia 
would thus maintain two regional governmental systems with autonomous powers 
and a national governmental system with specific powers (both having some 
areas of power overlap). Areas such as foreign ooi<rv, defense, federal fi­
nance, federal planning etc. would be under the sole dominion of the national
46
governmental system.
While granting greater autonomy to regions at home, the Czechoslovak 
leadership sought greater Independence abroad. During the reform period, 
Czechoslovak foreign policy was characterized by repeated assurances of loyal­
ty to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact but, at the same time, by a striving 
for greater Independence from both. The Czechoslovak position might best be 
represented by an article appearing In Rolnlcke Novlny on 6 April 1968:
W e c o n s i d e r  the interests of the whole socialist 
conwunlty, appreciate the contribution of the Soviet Union 
towards our well-being and safety, but the decisive considera­
tion of our home and foreign policy should be in the first 
place our own, Czechoslovak, needs. 47
In striving for greater Independence, the Czechoslovak leadership sought better 
relations with other Communist Parties and the West. In fact, when five 
Warsaw Pact nations sent a letter to the reform regime expressing their "concern
over events In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Parties of Western Europe gave
48
near unanimous support to the Czech cause. The Romanian and Yugoslavian
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leaderships also tended to back the Czechoslovaks— otherwise maintaining 
public -silence. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the Dubcek 
regime strove for qreater economic Independence from its fraternal Socialist 
brethren.*0
Finally, proposals for greater Czechoslovak decision-making in the 
command sector of the Warsaw Pact military alliance were initiated. Czecho­
slovak Defense Minister, Mertin Dzur, formulated suggestions for “international 
composition of the joint command and further bodies. . Dzur went as far
as proDosing an independent Czechoslovak military doctrine:
Such a specification of the military and political role of 
Czechoslovakia as a part of the Warsaw Treaty under the 
many possible conflict situations of the present which har­
monizes the national Interests with the international ones, 
can only lead to the improvement of the defense capabilities 
of our coalition. 52
Evidently, the reform leadership was even willing to assert its independence
1* an area of such peculiar sensitivity to Moscow as the military.
Thus, we are brought to a conclusion of the major political reforms
Initiated under the Dubcek leadership. It would be beneficial to once again
reiterate that the Action Program took effect on an ad hoc basis (the Press
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Law and Rehabilitation Law being two major exceptions). Also, as previous­
ly Indicated, the Party was not entirely cohesive in its approach to reform 
and feuds often erupted. Consequently, the final outcome of the Czechoslovak 
reforms rested with the writing and implementation of a new constitution 
scheduled to take place at the “14th Extraordinary Party Congress" (planned
g l
for early September). Heedless to say, the Congress never took place be­
cause of the Soviet invasion.
Armed with an overview of political reforms, we may now turn to a considera­
tion of the economic initiatives. Among the most significant developments,
the decision to Increase enterprise Independence and reduce government Inter* 
ference was of Immense Importance. In fact, the Action Pronram called for 
the government's role to be restricted to general economic decisions, long­
term planning, and consumer protection. The various economic ministries ex­
perienced losses of power, and a National Council was established as their 
55
watchdog.
Therefore, with government Interference reduced, economic reforms were
Initiated to modernize Industry, enhance competition and efficiency, and
Increase consumer production (with a subsequent rise 1n the standard of 11v-
1nq). To achieve those goals, Czechoslovak industry required sianificant
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changes in its macro-structure and reassessment of its foreign policy.
As might be expected, the problems associated with tremendous change in 
the economy were of massive nroportlons and complexity. Economist Ota Slk 
stated:
Enormous tasks face us 1n the development of production, 
the changes 1n the maco-structure, flexible '•hanqes of pro­
duction programmes, some obsolete factories will have to be 
dosed down and our producers must be exoosed to the harder 
oressure of the domestic and foreiqn market, the monoooly posi­
tion of enterprises must be replaced by comoetltlon both at 
home and by the medium of foreign trade. 57
To achieve the kind of competitiveness which S1k advocated, Czechoslovakia 
would have to alter its position within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), Increase its trade with the West, develop a convertible currency, and re­
duce Its protectionist policy In Industry. Czechoslovakia was suffering from a 
surplus 1n trade with the socialist bloc which could not be converted to hard
currency. Therefore, reforms 1n all the aforementioned categories were 1n1t1a-
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ted (much to the displeasure of Moscow and some Eastern European states).
As Frantlsek Hormouz announced.
. . . any commitments Czechoslovakia has taken uo or will do 
so In the future are consul tments undertaken at our own free 
decision because they are advantageous to our economy and not 
because we were forced to take them on by other CMEA member 
countries.
. . . Czecnoslovakia's cooperation within CMEA will gradually 
have to be precisely defined.. . . especially because not all 
enterprises and organizations of the CMEA member countries 
have such a position and powers as we want our enterprises to 
have in Czechoslovakia. 59
On that note, the leadership signalled its aogressive new economic olan and 
willingness to cross Moscow in order to correct oast problems.
Following reform measures forcinq Czechoslovak enterprises into positions 
of world market competition, industrial modernization would have to ensue If 
the country was to avoid being overwhelmed by the techoloqically superior 
Western corporations. In conjunction with their efforts to modernize and re­
assure the Soviets of a continued pro-Moscow orientation, the Czechoslovak 
leadership requested Soviet loans in convertible currency. The loans would 
then be used to purchase Western technology and equloment. Without Moscow's 
aid, Czechoslovakia would have no alternative but to turn West for badly need­
ed loans.
With reforms on greater decentralization of eocnomlc planning, local units 
of economic management were needed. As a result, the reform leadership pro­
posed programs calling for the establishment of "Worker's Counsils". The 
Councils would be composed primarily of workers, and all workers in the enter­
prise stood to gain materially from the successes of the company. Moreover, 
Council members would nominate potential enterprise managers, while retaining 
a say in his recall. In fact, the Council members would determine the manager's 
salary and share of dividends. Likewise, the Council also would aid in the 
assessment of the enterprise's position and would decide matters of fusion or 
division of the enterprise. The number of members on the council would range
53
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from ten to th1rty--the majority being workers elected by their peers
through secret ballot. The remaining Council members would be appointed
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specialists and state representatives. Finally, with the new leadership's 
Increased emphasis on consumer production (at the expense of heavy Industry), 
workers' benefiting directly from the profits of their enterorise would be
motivated to higher levels of production since Increased earnlnqs would have
6 3
utility In an expanded consumer market.
Ultimately, the Soviet leadership perceived the Czech experiment as
threatening to its position and, therefore, crushed it in late August of 1963.
As H. Gordon Skilling later described the Czechoslovak plight:
Ever since August 1968, Czechoslovakia has been livlnq in 
the shadow of the Invasion and has shown few , if any signs 
of recovering from that traumatic event. Gustav Husak, who 
displaced Alexander Oubcek in April 1969 as First Secretary 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (C.P.Cz), moved 
swiftly to block, or to reverse, the major reforms of 1968, 
including political democratization, freedom of expression 
and association, legal reform and rehabilitation, and planning 
and management reform, thus completlnqthe grim task of dis­
mantling the achievements and plans or 1968 which Oubcek had him­
self been forced to Initiate after h1s restoration to power. 64
In the face of Soviet tanks, the Czechoslovak people and their leaders had
no choice but to return to the stagnant and repressive methods previously
practiced.
Conclusions
During the progression of events leading up to the Czechoslovak Revolu­
tion, several trends reminiscent of events In 1956 Poland and Hungary, as 
well as some novel twists, emerged. To begin with, all three nations suf­
fered from economic hardships associated with disproportionate development of
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the economy. Secondly, the common feature of an orqanized intelligentsia 
also emerged (the Writers' Union and student grouns in Czechoslovakia and 
the Writers' Union and Intelligentsia clubs in Poland and Hungary). In­
deed, as previously discussed, the intelligentsia did much to increase pub­
lic awareness, pressure the regime, and reduce the leadership's authority.
Differences, however, begin to arise when discussing the climate of 
liberalization priir to the fall of the Old-Guard leadership. Both Poland 
and Hungary experienced a thaw in the aftermath of the New Course and the 
CPSU's Twentieth Congress. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, maintained 
a relatively represeive atmosphere, though a slight thaw followed the CPSU's 
Twenty-Second Congress. Under Novtny, the regime appeared ambivalent in 
responding to its cr1t1cs--somet1mes partaH^g onlv in verbal reprimands 
while at others resorting to overt action (such as dismissal from the Party, 
loss of citizenship, and legal prosecution).
In addition, in both Poland and Hungary, the masses actively contributed 
to the hardliners' demise and the progressives' assumption of power. No such 
actions manifested themselves in Czechoslovakia as the masses awoke only after 
the progressives were at the helm. A plausible explanation for the Czechoslo­
vak phenomenon suggests that mass action similar to Poland's loomed somewhere 
down the road, but Novotny's sudden fall precluded its emergence (the outburst 
of public actlvitiy following the dictator's removal might be viewed as sup­
portive of this explanation). Whether the Czechoslovak nation, with its his­
tory of civil obedience, could have exoloded in a manner similar to Hungary 
appears doubtful; nevertheless, in light of the street resistance to the 
Soviet invasion, the possibility should not be entirely ruled out.
Although some of the events associated with the Czechoslovak Revolution
are subject to differing interpretation* two unmistakable conclusions emerge 
in its aftermath: 1) intellectual organizations* despite a limited degree of
political relaxation* still can exert substantial nressure on the ruling re­
gime and 2) the early assumption of power by progressive elements encourages 
public activity and hastens the reform process.
V. Poland 1970: Riots and the Fall of Gomulka
Economic Decay and Popular Unrest
During mid-December 1970, Poland's political scene exploded is workers 
and students, responding to governmental fuel and food price hikes, took to 
the streets in protest. The first anti-government outbreak occurred in 
Gadansk and was followed by similar disruptions in other ma.jor cities.
I
Strong-arm governmental tactics, used to suppress the initially peaceful 
demonstrations, resulted in their becoming violent anti-regime riots. Ulti­
mately , the mass discontent led to Wladyslaw Gomulka's removal from power and 
the initiation of various reforms. r .
Although the Polish upheaval came on the heels of a publicly unpopular 
and poorly presented price Increase, its roots stemmed from much deeper 
sources. Specifically, Gomulka, the people's hero in the 1956 struggle for 
liberalization and progressive policies, reversed practically all of his re­
forms upon consolidating power. In the aftermath of the October Revolution, 
the leadership instituted an economic Council under the direction of Oskar 
Lange and assigned to it the task of formulating a new and dramatically pro­
gressive economic plan; however, none of the plan's solutions were fully 
Implemented as the government gradually returned to an emphasis on central 
planninq and forced Industrialization. 3y 1958, comprehensive wage and price 
reforms were shelved, and the active participation of workers in enterprise 
management ended as Workers' Councils were supplanted by governmentally- 
con trolled "workers self-government conferences". In general, Gomulka, aided
by conservative Party bureaucrats, succeeded in halting the entire reform
2movement by 1960,
Havinq returned the economy to the old practice of extensive develop­
ment, Gomulka and associates soon confronted serious economic difficulties.
In fact, between 1962 and 1963 signs of stagnation, the outgrowth of pre­
vious oolicies, surfaced. Seeing the critical need for revision, the leader-* 
ship again became interested in reform; nevertheless, the sluggish mechan­
isms of Party rule detained final approval of the new economic outline yntila 
Central Committee Plenum in Julv 1965. Not surorisinoly, party hardliners 
sought to water-down the plan and bureaucratic incomnetents further hampered
its implementation. Thus, a plan, which represented a step in the right di-
3
rection, simply petered out.
The crippling of economic reforms increased economic pressures and pro­
duced greater hardships for the Polish peonle. Throughout 1967, unrest a- 
mong the people heightened as lines for such basic qoods as clothing, meat* 
and vegetables lengthened. Ironically, at the same time, government ware­
houses swelled with overpriced and unsalable goods.4 Seeking to ration 
scarce items, the government raised meat prices bv thirty-percent and soon
followed with coal, electricity, cigarette , milk, fish, transportation and 
5
rent hikes. As a result of government measures, reported demonstrations 
erupted in Helena Gora, Warsaw, Bydgoszcz, Poznan, and Bialystok. The govern­
ment, in an effort to ease mounting tensions, launched a propaganda campaign 
aimed at blaming the price jumps on unanticipated employment increases and 
subsequent shifts in consumer demand. Needless to say, governmental explane*
c
tlons fell on unsympathetic ears.
The unhappiness characterizing urban areas was naralleled by similar 
feelings in the countryside. During a December 1967 farmers' conference in 
Poznan delegates Juried various governmental practices, including insuf­
ficient deliveries of fertilizer, farm equloment, and construction materials; 
unreasonable compulsory deliveries; and non-extension of health services to 
peasants. Nearly four thousands delegates attended the conference and the
complaints and questions raised numbered in the hundreds. Gomulka, present
7
at the conference, could not miss the gravity of the message.
The Polish economy's difficulties continued into 1963 and reached criti­
cal proportions. The leadership publicly acknowledged the seriousness of the 
situation and resorted to the standard practice of calling for tighter labor 
discipline and an increase in worker productivity. Some minor economic changes 
were instituted; for Instance, the direction and rate of investment were altered, 
In the final analysis, however, little was ^one to alleviate the most serious 
economic problems, particularly over-centralized olanninq. To be sure, the 
inefficient but politically loyal oarty officials remained in the driver's
The Intellectuals and Students
The mounting popular unrest in the wake of economic difficulties was 
further exacerbated by rising discontent among the intelligentsia. Gomulka's 
reversal of the 1956 democratization (known as the "small stabilization") never 
sat well with the Intellectual elite. In 1964, undaunted by the regime's 
tactics of intimidation— which included harassment, restrictions on orinting 
materials, and censorship— non-Party writers released a letter of protest
*s
known as the "Letter of the 34". Two years later, Leszek Kolakowski (Party 
member and prominent philosooher) spoke out against the reversal of he 1956 
liberalization and subsequently was dismissed from the Party. The regime's 
heavy-handedness brought on still further protest as twenty-two noted Party 
writers came out in support of Kolakowski. Not being ones to hold out the 
olive branch, the leadership added several of the twenty-two writers' names 
to their list of ex-Party members.
In stifling intellectual expression, the Party fueled already simmering 
anti-government sentiments. In March of 1968, matters came to a head when 
government censors forced the closinq of Adam Mickiewicz's nlay Dziady (Fore­
fathers). The callous governmental action incensed Warsaw University students 
who responded by demonstrating. When two students, Adam Michnik and Henryk 
Szlajfer, were expelled from the University for taking party in the protest, 
new demonstrations erupted. The government, maintaining its hardline approach, 
sent busloads of militiawen to forcibly end the disturbance. Several arrests 
were made including those of Jacek Kuror, and Karol Modzelewski.
The students, angered by the government's actions and embolJened by word 
of growing reform in Czechoslovakia, returned to the streets the following day 
(March 9) and called on the peoole of Poland to join them. Intense clashes 
with the militia, now using tear gas and nightsticks, ensued. The anti-regime 
demonstrations peaked on March 11, as crowds unknown since the 1957 closing of 
the student newspaper Po frostu turned out. Tans of thousands of Poles, in­
cluding adults and youngsters, battled with the militia. Using whatever means 
were available, the angry mob eventually overran the Ministry of Culture and 
the Kultura Theater. After a drawn out fight, the militia finally succeeded
*
in disoersing the demonstrators, and aporoximately three hundred arrests were 
made. In the days that followed, large scale demonstrations in support of 
the Warsaw students broke out in several major Polish universities. For Its 
part, the Party press viciously attacked the student actions, publicly re­
vealed the names of high-ranking Party officials whose children participated,
1?
and employed anti-Semitism as a polemical weapon. "
The Catholic Church
One other distinct antagonist of the Gomulka regime emerged before the
1970 riots, namely the Catholic Church. Following the events of 1956, the
Party and Church reached a modus vivendi; however, during the 1960's the
Party reneged on pledges concerning religious instruction and the drafting of
seminary students, thus bringinq the truce to an end. In 1966, signalling
both its strength and displeasure with the regime, the Church rallied Poles
around its cause. The government countered with its own demonstrations,
13
though far smaller in size than those of the Church.
The End of Gomulka's Reiqn and the Rise of Gierek
Thus, by antagonizing various sections of society, Gomulka set the stage 
for his own removal. In describing oost-1957 Poland, Zbigniew Pelczynski 
stated:
The subsequent consolidation of the Party's rule, the abondoning 
of many hoped-for reforms, and Poland's return to the fold of the 
Soviet bloc lost Gomulka much of [his] popularity. It was eroded 
still further by bitter quarrels with the Catholic Church in the
I960*s, by the conflict with students, writers, and intellectuals 
in 1968 and, as far as the working class was concerned, by the 
stagnation in their living standards during the 1960's. The price
changes of 13 December were the last straw. 14 
Having taken all they could stand, the Polish workers fought back in the
15
only way they knew how: by holding strikes and rioting.
The widespread nature and extreme violence associated with the workers'
outburst led Gomulka to send in the armed forces to brutally crush the
rebellion. Within the Politbureau, however, several members opposed the
harsh measures. The Politbureau soon became embroiled in a heated debate;
during which, Gomulka suffered a minor stroke. Gomulka's illness provided
the opposition with an opportunity to exploit the situation, which they did
by securing the First Secretary's resignation. The lack of strong Soviet
support for Gomulka, possibly owing to the old leader's normalization of
relations with West Germany and independent moves in the economic arena,
cleared the way for Edward Gierek's election to the position of First
16
Secretary and the start of reform.
Gierek's rise to power marked the beginning of several changes. Dur­
ing the initial stage, the Party leadership was shaken-up as Gomulka sup­
porters were ousted in favor of Gierek appointments. Moreover, the lower 
levels of the Party also were to be cleansed as interviews were conducted 
to determine the relative acceptability of Party members. Likewise, the 
importance ofidealoglcal training gained renewed importance and strenuous 
efforts were made to invigorate the Party. Apoarently, Gierek hoped to
fashion a Party apparatus capable and willing to enforce his decisions.
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On the economic front, Glerek moved oulckly to stabilize the 
situation. To begin with, the First Secretary reduced food prices,
Increased wages, and promised workers a greater voice 1n management, 
a democratization of unions, and better working conditions. Next, he 
moved to Increase agricultural productivity by Improving conditions for 
Individual farmers, Glerek's many oledoes to the masses depended on In­
creasing foodstuffs, thereby making the farmer's role extremely Important.
The leadership approached the problem with a two-pronoed attack. The first 
prong aimed at Increasing security for farmers; the second focused on making 
farming more profitable. To Increase security, the regime extended leral 
ownership of the land to the farmers ( a natter left hanging 1n the air 
since the end of World War II), reduced obstacles blocking land sale and 
Inheritance, and extended the national health service to the countryside.
To enhance farming's profitability, Glerek ended compulsory deliveries, revised 
taxes, abolished Gomulka's grain policy (aimed at autarky), encouraged animal
breeding, and Increased the accessablUty of credit, fertilizer, fodder and
Id
other Important supplies.
Although no real political democratization took place, the Glerek re­
gime attempted to establish the anoearance of such a development. Cne method 
was to Increase the Sejm's (Parliament.' activities, though this consisted of more 
speeches not more power. A second method concerned court action against enter-
prise managers. Although few managers were dismissed, the workers initiated
several legitimate lawsuits, based on managerial violation of contracts.
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Surprisingly, the workers often won.
Finally, the government sought to reduce tensions with the u.urch. A- 
mong the agreements reached, the Issuance of building permits for new churches 
removal of Inventory regulations on Church oroperties, and the transfer of ti­
tle to former German places of worship were perhaps the most important. In 
addition, the government promoted good will among the religious and national­
istic by appointing a Catholic bishop to the committee for the reconstruction
of the Warsaw royal castle. Finally, the Gierek leadership also moved to bet-
20
ter relations with the Vatican.
Conclusions
In summation, the 1970 Polish upheaval was brouqht on by economic stagna­
tion so repugnant to the people that thev ultimately resorted to violent oo- 
positicn. Although the intelligentsia, namely writers and students, also 
voiced and mounted opposition to the Gomulka regime, their contribution to 
solidifying anti-regime sentiments and promoting the events of 1970 were mini­
mal. Evidently, workers were just plain fed up with the leadership, and the 
price hikes of late December triggered their wrath. Thus, without an intelli­
gentsia actively engaged in raising public awareness and focusing pressure on 
issues of democratization, the new Gierek regime was able to stablize the situ* 
atlon by implementing only piecemeal economic solutions (aimed at gratifylnq 
the immediate worker demands). Lacking true oolitical and economic reforms 
capable of addressing the root problems and not the symptoms » Poland remained
ripe for yet another upheaval.
Curiously, 1970 Poland represents a development somewhere between the 
Pllsen-Berlin examples and the Poland (195S)-Hungary-Czechos1ovakia exarmies. 
Because of the substantial leadership chanqe and the implementation of some 
economic reform, 1970 Poland somewhat resembled the examples of the latter 
three. However, the very limited scooe of Polish economic chanoe and the 
lack of political reform, coupled with the fact that perhaps no change would 
have occurred had Gomulka not suffered a stroke, create a significant resem­
blance between 1970 Poland and the Pilsen-Berlin examples. Among other fac­
tors, perhaps the limited effectiveness of Poland's intelligentsia produced 
the 1 ini ted results.
VI. Poland 1980: Failure of the Glerek Gamble and the Birth of Solidarity*
Developments 1n the First Half of the 1970's
As previously discussed, Glerek's first economic Initiatives focused on 
stabilizing the situation 1n Poland and not on providing a framework for la­
ter, more substantive, reforms. The nation's chronic economic nllght, how­
ever, necessitated the development of a new and comprehensive economic pro­
gram 1f further unrest was to be avoided. Therefore, the leadership formu­
lated Its "New Development Strategy"; a plan designed to achieve an Inten­
sive pattern of development while retaining substantial rates of Investment.
By exploiting the slumplnq world economic conditions and atmosnhere of de­
tente present in the early 1970's, the leadership obtained Western credit 
with which to modernize Industry, exoand consumntlon, and maintain a ballooned 
Investment policy. The visible absence of managerial, declsion-makina, and 
investment reforms demonstrated Glerek's willingness to substitute an influx 
of foreign credit— despite the resulting debt— 1n the place of fundamental 
reforms.1
Glerek's bold gamble rested on several assumptions. First, it was hoped 
that the newly obtained foreign technology, supported by heavy investment in 
construction, would promote substantial leaps in productivity, particularly 
for high technology Items marketable in the West. Secondly, planners expected
*Because of Its extraordinary developments and recent occurrence, Poland's 
1980 reform movement will be treated in a more detailed manner than previous 
sections.
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the technology to diffuse throughout the economy--thereby quickening the 
pace at which obsolete equipment and Soviet-style techniques were replaced.
In addition, with an expansion of consumer production, labor productivity 
and quality were expected to increase while popular unrest was to decrease, 
Finally, and most importantly, the regime anticipated export surplussessome­
time soon after moernization and planned to use the resulting hard currency
2
to repay its loans.
If everything had worked according to plan, Gierek probably would have 
managed to placate the populace without major , »1 itical and economic reforms; 
nevertheless, many factors combined to bring the program into a ruinous state. 
Among the factors outside the leadership*s control were unusually harsh wea­
ther conditions (which hampered agricultural production) and world economic 
fluctuations (which disrupted government planning). Unavoidably, therefore, 
Poland procured Western grain and additional, higher priced, equipment. Hore 
serious, however, Poland failed to maintain planned exports* As Garv R, Teske 
of the U.S. Department of Connerce pointed out:
. . . This lagging export performance stemmed from numerous factors: 
supply constraints, reduced Western demand, Western import barriers, 
product quality shortfalls, marketing and servicina problems, as 
well as various systemic oroblems inherent to centrally-planned econo 
mies. The resulting huge trade deficits forced Poland to borrow more 
heavily than expected and pushed its net hard currency debt up from 
$2 billion at year end 1973 to almost S20 billion by year end 1979, .
This growing Polish debt signaled the deterioration of G*erek‘s olan and the
ever-increasing danger of economic ruin.
The gathering storm of economic disaster gained on additional impetus when
the government lost control of investment and personal income increases. As
one might well imagine, a classic case of too many zloty chasing too few goods
ensued, thereby reducing labor incentives and aggravating worker discontent.
To make matters worse, unrealistic construction plans produced numerous 
instances where purchased equipment sat idle; severe damage and even complete 
ruin of some equipment followed inadequate storage; and ramoant corruption 
permeated the administrative hierarchy. Such lame scale squandering of 
resources promoted adverse public sentiments--both fmm visihile privations 
and suspected abuses.
1976 Riots and the Birth of KOR
By June 1976, the steady deterioration of Derek's New Development 
Strategy, with its subsequent economic imbalances, necessitated stern measures* 
The government, resisting reform, enacted price hikes. As in 1970, the Polish 
workers took to the streets in protest. Disturbances reportedly broke out in 
as many as seven areas, wi th those in Radorn and Ursus beinq the most violent.** 
Concurrent with a quick price reversal, the government mercilessly suppressed 
the demonstrations and severely punished numerous participants. The harsh 
government action prompted the formation of the intellectual committee for the 
Offense of the Workers (KOR). Upon its creation, KOR (later renamed Committee 
for Social Self-Defense) contained only fourteen members but grew steadily. 
Among the organizations more prominent members were Professor Edward lioinski 
(the 1956 reform economist previously mentioned), writer Jerzy Andrewski, and
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historians Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik.
KOR basically operated as a pressure group and supported the workers in 
several ways. The most direct method centered on collecting funds for workers 
fined or fired in the wake of governmental reprisals. In the hope of elicit’
external support and increasing pressure on the regime, KOR released communiques 
describing the workers' plight to foreign correspondents. The Committee active­
ly an* meticulously documented cases of governmental absue:
Me have data concerning 11 deaths [ in Radom ], probably in 
connection with the incidents of June 25. However, only 
four cases have thus far been fully confirmed: Rev. Roman
Kctlarz, who was beated up by unknown assailants and died 
in hospital on August IB in krychowice near Radom; Jan 
3rozyna, who was killed by employees if she Citizens Mili­
tia on Koszarowa Street, Radom, on Jut.° 10; and Henryk Ze- 
backi and Jan Labecki, who were killed hy the trailer-end 
of a tractor as they were putting up a barricade.
. . . The committee investigated 16 cases of detention on 
or after June 25 in Radom and 94 cases at 'Jrsus. Of these,
93 persons in Radom and 45 at llrsus declared that they hqd 
been beaten up and their families had seen the trices of 
such maltreatment. Both in Radom and at Ursus, as well as 
in several other places of detention, those arrested were 
passed throuqh the so-called 'paths of health,' i.e., forced 
to run militia gauntlets. . .3
Undented by government harassment, KOR stressed that 1t would only dissolve:
. . . when those institutions [trade unions, social security, etc.] 
take up their responsibilities, when the reprisals stop, when 
amnesty goes Into effect, when all the victimized people are 
rehabilitated, when all workers are reinstated on previous 
terms, when the public is fully informed of the scope of the 
post-June protests, and when those guilty of abuses and of law­
breaking are brought to justice,. . . Until such time, however—  
regardless of slander, forgeries, intimidations, and retaliatory 
measures— the committee feels it is its duty to the oeople, who 
by their generosity have proved their solidarity with the Committee 
for the Defense of the Workers, to continue its efforts, which 
correspond fully with moral and legal standards and the expecta­
tions of society. 9
During the years following the 1976 riots, KOR reorganized and solidified 
its position. The committee, though continuing to chamoion workers' issues and 
even producing the unofficial paper Robotnik (The Worker), increasingly Dressed 
for a general nationwide liberalization. Experience gained from sustained op­
position to the regime led to a more effective, outspokentand aggressive cam-
paign for reform, Moreover, the growing links between the intellectuals and 
trackers represented significant Dolitical clout with which to oressure the 
Party leadership. KOR possessed the organization, coimiunications, and plan­
ning experience necessary for confronting the regime; however, such political 
commodities alone could not force the leadership to capitulate to any demands 
and, therefore, some real political leverage was needed. Bv suooorting the 
cause of the workers, who maintained the ability to cripple the economy through 
work stoppages, KOR helped forge a loose and tacit cooperative bond of substan­
tial political potential. As will be shown, the events of August 1930 and 
subseguent developments in Poland bear witness to the combined strength of the 
Intellectuals and workers.
Strikes of 1980 and the Formation of Solidarity
In mid-1980, economic problems and governmental actions similar to those 
producing the 1976 riots gave rise to major upheavals within Poland. At the 
time, the nation was suffering from chronic shortages of all types of go^ds, 
and by the beginning of 1981, an estimated debt of S27 billion had been in­
curred.^ As was the case in 1970 and 1976, the triggering event was a govern­
ment Increase 1n meat prices (implemented on July 1, 1980). The new meat pric­
ing policy quickly elicited an angry worker response. Between 1 July and 8 ♦
August workers from some 150 enterprises througnout the country struck for 
higher wages. As the strikes gathered momentum, worker demands became increas­
ingly political in nature; for example, Gdansk workers insisted on a memorial
for the victims of the 1970 demonstrations and on the formation of free trade 
12
unions.
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KOR, moving to support the workers on the first day of the strikes, acted 
as a strike information agency. Soon after, despite government harassment, 
the committee offered the strikers financial assistance, help in coordinating 
communications and organization, and aid in securing the advice of experts.
By August 16, the strikers, utilizing KOR's assistance, forged the Inter­
factory Strike Committee (NIKS). The MKS sought to represent all strikers and 
quickly formulated a large set of demands concerning freedom of speech and 
Information, free trade unions, and the release of political prisoners. Repre­
senting some 400 factories strong as of 22 Aunust, MKS and its emerging leader-
12
ship figure. Lech Walesa, pushed for the opening of offical negotiations.
At the outset of the strikes, the government remained adamant in pursuing 
its policies and downplayed early unrest; nevertheless, as the tide of work 
stoppages reached critical proportions, the reqime adopted a mixed conciliatory- 
hardline position. Wage concessions were granted in most Instances, sometimes 
without their being requested, as the government sought to undercut unrest 
before matters got totally out-of-hand. Ironically, at the same time that 
wage increases were meted out, the government proclaimed its inability to make 
such concessions— a factor further deteriorating the regime's credibility. 
Perhaps most Indicative of the government's slipping control was the fact that 
many settlements occurred directly between the workers and management. '4
Notwithstanding governmental wage increases, several MKS branch leaderships 
pressed for additional and more political concessions. The first breakthrough 
appeared on 22 August when Mieczyslaw Jagielski, politbureau member and chief 
troubleshooter of the government's special strike commission, agreed to open 
talks with the Gdansk MKS. Negotiations stretched through numerous sessions
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and broke off several times. In the early stages the government continuous­
ly delayed, appeared unyielding, and even resorted to disseminating false 
information; however, as the strikes continued to spread, a genuine dialogue 
developed. The mounting national crisis did much to shake-up the Polish
United Workers' Party (PUWP) as evidenced by the many personnel changes of
15
24 August, and therein may H e  the reason for the regime's new position.
During the negotiations, KOR suffered from stepped up government harass­
ment, including several arrests, but was firmly supported bv intellectuals 
within and without the country. The Catholic Church, hODing to avert blood­
shed, acted as a moderating influence. Within this context, worker resolution 
finally paid off with the signing of an agreement on 31 August. The agreement 
included:
. . . [the] right to establish self-governing trade unions 
independent of the government; sumission of [a] new bill 
concerning censorship to Sejm by end of this year; radio 
broadcasts of Sunday Hass; release from jail of political 
prisoners pending review of their cases; settlement of 
details of economic matters in further negotiations. A- 
greement requires publication of minutes of negotiations 
and full text of accord. Gdansk strike is declared over. 16
Despite the conclusion of the Gdansk strike, numerous work stoppages persisted
throughout the country; therefore, the regime adopted the Gdansk agreement as
a general outline with which to end the nationwide upheaval--much to Moscow's
’  7
displeasure.'
Though sporadic strikes continued, the nation's labor upheaval gradually 
subsided as the workers began the process of running their newly-created unions. 
Needless to say, tensions persisted, and the struggle was no where near complete. 
Perhaps the most ironic and tragic development of the two months following the 
initial unrest occurred on 5 September with Edward Gierek's fall from ocwer.
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The enthusiastic and sincere popular support once enjoyed by the First Secre­
tary no longer remained in 1980. The fallen ex-crusader, following the pat­
tern of his predecessor Gomulka, was removed from power by the Central Com­
mittee during a hospital stay. Stanislaw Kania, head of the internal securi­
ty aparat, succeeded Gierek as First Secretary and, thus, a new element in
18
Poland's struggle for economic renewal was added.
Ouring the closing months of 1980, Poland witnessed a continuation of 
the labor-government struggle. Despite some positive governmental actions, 
including the broadcasting of Catholic Mass, stepping up of efforts at rooting- 
out corrupt Party officials, permitting the formation of the Independent Student 
Association, and registering of LOT (Polish national airline) workers as the 
first independent union, labor leaders perceived that, on the whole, the govern­
ment was seeking to forestall or undermine implementation of the labor accords. 
In response, Solidamosc (Solidarity, the central organ of the independent 
trade unions) carried out a one hour warning strike on 3 October 1n which hun­
dreds of thousands of workers participated. Undoubtedly, some party officials 
remained adamant in resisting labor's demands despite the workers' show of 
force; however, If the removal of several Gierek supporters durinq a Central
Committee plenum three days after the strike is any indicator, the leadership's
19
sensitivity to labor's actions was substantial.
In late October, Solidarity's distrust of the government reached new 
heights following arbitrary changes of the union's statutes by a Warsaw court. 
Although labor leaders had applied for legal registration of the union in accor­
dance with the Gdansk agreements (on 24 September), the court manipulated the 
document so as to recognize the existing political system. Union leaders re­
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garded such amendments as unacceptable, especially since Solidarity expoused 
apolitical intentions. Several government leaders, including First Secretary 
Kania, sought to allay Solidarity's apprehensions by acknowledging the unions' 
contributions and Importance; nevertheless, the olive branch was always ac­
companied by stern reminders of the Party's leading role. For the most nart, 
the burgeoning crisis was defused on 10 November when Poland's Supreme Court 
reversed a lower court's ruling and extended legal registration to Solidarity
according to its original statutes. Thus, Solidarity became a legal, official,
20self-governing, and independent trade union.
Unlike their urban counterparts, peasants met stiff governmental resistance 
to their efforts to establish independent agricultural unions. On October 29, 
a Warsaw court, arguing that farmers were self-employed and, therefore, didn't 
need unions, rejected the farmers' petition for legal registration. In the 
face of popular support for the farmers, however, the court attempted to re­
duce the conflict to semantics by instructing the farmers to reapply as an 
"association". Curiously, the growing sympathy for the peasants even spread
to government officials as the agricultural unions, pending final decision by
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the Supreme Court, were permitted to function locally.
The precarious situation in Poland, already exacerbated by the government's 
conflict with the workers and farmers, was unset further by intra-party faction­
alism. At the Seventh Plenum of the Party's Central Committee (held during the 
first days of December), First Secretary Kania sought to stem the Party's de­
teriorating position by delivering a rallying address in support of Polish 
socialism. In essence, the First Secretary argued that:
. . .  1. the current oarty leadership had obtained the international
conditions necessary for Poland to solve Its internal problems, 
and 1s grateful to the CPSU for the confidence It had shown in 
the Polish party; 2. the policy of socialist renewal, the 
rebuilding of workers' confidence In the party, and the compact 
with the people are all 'unshakable'; 3. the party's attitude 
to Solidarity Is a positive one; 4. all forces contributing 
to the threat of anarchy must be resisted; 5. the party allows 
freedom of expression and criticism, but 1t.s program, policy, 
and resolutions must be observed by all members; 6. the inde­
pendence, security, and peace of Poland are based on the princi­
ple of the party's leading role; 7. it is necessary to dis­
tinguish between personal accountability for political errors, 
which only requires oaying the political consequences, and re­
sponsibility for actions, which necessitates legal proceedings;
3. the party, as the guarantor of socialist renewal, must also 
be its prime mover; 9. the party had learned form the experi­
ence of December 1970, and its decision in August to solve the 
crisis through political means was proof of this; 10. the party 
should strive to build a 'broad alliance of wise and responsible 
forces' at every level throughout the country; 11. the party 
is in favor of reconstructing 'branch' (professional) labor 
unions, of honest and multilateral cooperation with Colidarity.
In conclusion, Kanla called for an extraordinary Ninth PUWP Con­
gress to be held in the spring of next year. 22
Thus, although somewhat conciHatroy toward Solidarity, Secretary Kania asserted 
Party supremacy in no uncertain terms.
Several developments at the plenum and subsequent to it were of great im­
portance. First, Gierek and his last contingent of supporters within the Party 
were stripped of their remaining power, and the controversial Mieczyslaw Meczar 
was elected to the politburo. Second, Jozef Pinkowski delivered a report on 
the country's economic status depicting a near across-the-board decline, with 
th} coming of Christmas, severe food shortages, especially of sugar, lard, meat, 
potatoes, and butter, necessitated drastic governmental actions; therefore, 
food rationing and large-scale importation of foodstuffs (mostly from CMEA 
countries) ensued. Third, despite Increased 1iberalization of society, 
vicious attacks against KOR (including such wild allegations as the maintaining
of links with left-wing terrorist groups) persisted. Apparently, by brandinq 
KOR as a subversive and antisocialist element, the government sought to divide 
the workers and their intellectual supporters. Fourth, in the face of vitu­
perative Soviet accusations and a growing perception of a potential military 
intervention, Solidarity leaders and Party officials vehemently denied allega­
tions of a counterrevolutionary threat. Fifth, at a Warsaw episcopal confer­
ence (held on 10 and 11 December), the Polish Catholic Church expressed its 
support of the country's social renewal and apprehension over a potential re­
versal if public calm was not achieved. Finally, private farmers held a na­
tional meeting in Warsaw (December 14) and proclaimed the formation of the 
independent agricultural union "Rural Solidarity". While awaiting leaal 
recognition, the farmers' union drew up demands for better pensions, removal 
of press censorship, and a reintroduction of religious courses in state 
schools.23
1981: The Struggle Continues and Peaks
Although 1980 ended without major incident, the early months of 1981 wit­
nessed greater conflict between Solidarity and the government. In fact, while 
the government experienced intensified pressure from its socialist allies to 
halt and even reverse reforms, Solidarity pressed for additional concessions, 
including work-free weekends and access to the media. Unwilling to wait for 
the government to share available media, Solidarity even began publishing its 
own weekly Jednosc (Unity). Solidarity's boldness in publishing Jednosc and a 
decision by the Polish Supreme Court upholding a lower court's refusal to 
register Rural Solidarity combined to intensify mutuil distrust. The already
delicate situation was aggravated further by numerous local disputes and worker 
willinqness to resort to threatened strikes, str’ke alerts, sit-ins, warning 
strikes, and general strikes. Seemingly, as soon as the government averted 
one crisis, a new one appeared. Even the students began agitating— using tac­
tics adopted from the workers. In the wake of the unrest, many local party
officials were forced to resign, and at the Central Committee's Eignth Plenum
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Prime Minister Josef Pinkowski was replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski 
Although the government agreed to a 42-hour work-week, attempted to re­
solve local disputes peacefully, and began legislation on certain reform .mea­
sures (i.e. the workers' self-government law), it nearly lost control of the 
situation when security policemen seriously injured several Solidarity members 
while physically removing them from government offices in 3vdgoszcz (Ma-ch 19). 
When Party officials came out in support of the police, Solidarity mobilized 
for a prolonged general strike— even as Warsaw Pact maneuvers took place in 
and around Poland. The strike was averted, however, when the government agreed 
that the police actions ran contrary to the spirit of solving disputes through 
negotiations and provided Solidarity with televised coverage of its version of 
the incident. Apparently, many Party members at the Central Committee's Ninth
Plenum were less than enthused by the settlement and called for a shoring up
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of the Communist Party.
To be sure, a hardline faction existed within the PUWP; however, the 
numerous Party shake ups m d  the increased atmosphere of democratization fol­
lowing the August strikes produced significant changes within the Party. In­
deed, by the early months of 1981, over a third of the PUWP's members held 
dual membership in Solidarity. 4s the Party's membership transformed, calls 
for reform of the internal decision-making process arose. Of marked importance
Secretary Kania oublicly endorsed the use of secret ballets >■. -jenuine 
competition in electing delegates to the PUWP's Fxtraordinary July Con­
gress. Efforts were even made to oust Stefan OHzowski and Tadeusz Srabski, 
two Party hardliners; however, a supportive letter sent by the Soviet Central
Committee and Bre2 hnev's reported phoning of Kania barred acceptance of the 
26resignations.
The month of Hay (1981) saw the emergence of four additional develop­
ments influencing Poland's reform process. To Deoin with, Rural Solidarity 
received its long sought after legal recognition, an act significantly re­
ducing a major source of tension. Second, the government forwarded its long- 
awaited economic report and stabilization program to the Polish Sejm. Ap­
parently, the Sejm, viewing the document as a mere enumeration of past fail­
ures and void of substantive corrective measures, rejected the government's 
proposal after intense debate (a testament to the Sejm's growing independence 
from Party control). On the university scene, Polish students held demonstra­
tions calling for a release of political prisoners, and although announcement 
of the protests was received with considerable apprehension, they passed with­
out major incident. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Stefan Cardinal 
Wysznski, Primate of Poland, died on 28 May. Under the Cardinal^ skillful 
leadership, the Polish Catholic Church rose to a prominence unmatched by 
other Eastern European religious institutions. Loss of the Cardinal'$ far­
sightedness and moderating influence undoubtedly complicated the country's
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process of social renewal.
As the °o1ish Nation approached the one year anniversary of the strikes 
giving rise to Solidarity, attention focused on the PUWP's Extraordinary Ninth
Party Congress. As previously mentioned, the election process for the Con­
gress included such democratic reborns as secret ballots and multiple candi­
dates. In addition, the Congress, representing a chance for the Polish Com­
munist Party to renew itself and regain some credibility, came at a time 
when worker-government tensions were once again on the rise. The point of 
conflict centered on the degree of worker participationin enterprise decision­
making. Illustrative of the sharp division between the two sides was the 
fact that government and union leaders drew uo separate draft laws governing 
the role of workers in decision-making. Although differences existed over a 
variety of policy and management issues {including the degree to which market 
factors should come into olay), none was more heated than the disagreement over 
who should appoint enterprise directors, and the disagreement nearly boiled 
Over ih early July when Polish Airline (LOT) employees held a warning strike
td underscore their position. A prolonged strike was averted only after both
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sides agreed to further negotiations.
It is against this background that the Ninth Congress opened on 14 July.
The Congress' most salient feature clearly centered on the multitude of oer- 
sonnel changes within the Party hierarchy. The Party rank and file, ex­
hibiting their dissatisfaction with established Party and government bureau­
crats, turned them out practically en masse and elected large numbers of workers 
and technicians in their place. Of the few survivors:
, . . only three former CC secretaries (Kazimierz Barcikowski, 
Jt*n1slaw Xenia, and Stefan Olszowski); five cabinet members 
(HAjciech Jeruzelski, Hieczyslaw Rakowski, Jozef Czyrek,
*1ro*law Milewski, and Jerzy Wojtecki); two deputy defense- 
ministers; and eight voivodshio first secretaries (out of forty- 
nine) are on the new committee, while none of the seventeen CC
department heads were included in it. In other words, the 
group that formerly accounted for well over half of the CC 
membership is now reduced to a mere 3.5.. 30
In a similar vein, the delegates moved against former First Secretary Gierek
by removing him from Party membership— an act unparalleled by developments
within any other East bloc Comnunist Party since the ournes of the late
1940‘s.
In addition to selecting a new leadership, the delegates formed sixteen 
working groups to examine the country's most pressing problems. Reportedly, 
some of the more important proposals forwarded by the working committees in­
cluded: reducing harassment of religious Party members, curbing the cowers
of top Party bodies, strengthening the Se’m and the Supreme Court, relaxina 
censorship, democratizing the educational system, buttressing the market sys­
tem, Increasing market production, stabilizing prices, reaffirming the im­
portance of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, expanding energy production and 
conservation, guaranteeing greater recognition and influence to private agri­
culture, improving intellectual representation in various Party bodies, re­
organizing national policy on scientific research and technology, increasing 
emphasis on national health and environmental Issues, treating trade unions 
on an equal footing (provided they adhered to trade union legislation), fixing 
a new minimum wage, guaranteeing minimal living standards for the populace, 
limiting housing to one abode per family, and expanding opportunities for 
non-Party experts (provided they recognized the principles of Socialism).
All of the above proposals were agreed to after what appeared to be heated,
closed-door, debates and under the shadow of reoeated exhortations of the
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Party's leading »*ole.
Following the end of the Ninth Congress, Poland suffered a turbulent 
one-month period during which oreparations were made for Solidarity's First 
National Congress. At the time, two nervasive problems plagued .ie nation:
1) continuing food shortages and 2) escalating government-union antagonism, 
particularly over access to and censorshio of the media. As reoards the 
former, the situation became so critical as to promnt Solidarity's National 
Co-ordinating Commission (KKP) to demand Solidarity-soonsored Social Commis­
sion oversight of food oroduction and distribution. For its nart, tne govern­
ment created an anti-speculation commission and requested Solidarity to aban­
don political activities and strikes. Although rejection the government's 
request, the KKP urged Solidarity members to halt strikes oendinq the union's 
National Congress and to work eight additional free Saturdays during 1981.
In a more direct move, Solidarity's Gdansk leadership ordered a loading ban
on food exports and in so doing prompted an investigation by the provincial 
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Prosecutor.
With the approach of Solidarity’s National Congress, government-union 
antagonism over the media became extremely acute, especially after anti- 
Soviet cartoons and articles surfaced in union journals. The Soviet Union, 
already outraged by vandalism directed at Soviet war memorials in Poland, 
underscored its concern with Polish events by orchestrating East block press 
tirades against Poland and substantially augmenting its Baltic naval forces. 
Under mounting Soviet pressure, the government halted printing of the Katowice 
steel works paper Wolny Zwiazkowiec (Free Trade Unionist), a iournal notorious 
for anti-Soviet sentiments and initiated several investigations of oaners 
suspected of similar transgressions. The government's actions set off a
series of printers' strikes, and tensions mounted when the government 
confiscated a Solidarity publication at llstrzyki Dolne. Two days before 
the opening of Solidarity's National Congress, the KKP responded by demand­
ing access to radio and television not only for Solidarity, but for all 
prominent public organizations. The next day the Soviets followed by begin­
ning land and naval exercise around Poland. Aqainst thi; background, oar*.
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one of Solidarity's First National Congress ooened on 5 September 19S1.
At the onset of the Congress, Solidarity declined to admit the State's 
broadcasting systems--ow1ng to disagreement over editorial control; neverthe­
less, the Congress was widely reported by the Polish media. Lech Walesa 
opened the session with a speech stressing unity as the key to success. The 
following day, Andrzej Celinski, Solidarity Secretary, was reported bv the 
Polish news agency (PAP) as having claimed: “A revolution, whose main force
is Solidarity, 1s taking place in Poland." Apparently, this remark co­
incided with some debate over recognition of the Party's leading role and the 
ultimate organization of Solidarity. The real fireworks, however, began on 
8 September. The delegates, calling on the Sejm to hold a referendum with 
regard to workers' self-management, threatened to have Solidarity initiate 
ti» proposal Itself if the Sejm declined. Next, the Congress drafted a sup­
portive message to East European workers seeking independent unions. Finally, 
at the close of the Congress, the delegates reiterated Solidarity's goal of 
a better life for all, called for free elections to government bodies, and
; stressed the Importance of a sovereign Poland ( a thinly veiled reference
36
to Soviet domination).
Surprisingly, Warsaw television and radio carried Solidarity's message
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to East European workers; nevertheless, Trybuna tudu (the Party paper) de­
nounced it, and Zolnierz Wolnosci (the A m y  paoer) warned of the consequences 
Solidarity faced if it continued on its present path. The scolding from the 
Polish leadership, however, amounted to a slap on the wrists, when comoared 
to the scathing denounciat ions released from other East bloc countries. In­
deed, Solidarity's ambitions were variously oortrayed as political, counter­
revolutionary, and self-servinq, true sins by Communist standards. Taking "P 
where the bloc press left off, the Polish leadership strengthened its hard­
line stance toward Solidarity. For instance, Party organs and officials re­
leased declarations and gave speeches accusing Solidarity of violating its 
agreements with the government and seeking political nower. As the two most 
vocal critics of Sol1darity--Deouty Prime Minister ’akowski and Party Secre­
tary Olszowskl— increased pressure on Solidarity, the union's KKP Presidium 
sought a compromise. 3y conceding the State's right to aopoint and dismiss 
directors for nationally sensitive enterprises, Solidarity's leadership hoped 
to reduce tensions, deter government Interference with work-free Saturdays, and 
remove offlcal restrictions on the weekly Solidarity. Despite Solidarity's
overtures, tension remained high prior to the second round of Solidarity's
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National Congress.
The second part of the Congress opened on 26 September, and activities 
generally focused on electing a new union leadership; nevertheless, several 
notable developments transpired. Perhaps most shocking was Professor Edward 
Upinski's announcement of KOR's dissolution. In his address, Lipinski ex­
plained that since K0R’T"activities were being assumed by other organizations 
such as Solidarity, KOR need no longer exist. In light of government attacks
on Solidarity's ties to KOR, the latter's dissolution might best be inter-
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preted as the removal of a liability on the former.
Other notable outcomes of the Congress included a rejection of the KKP's
worker self-government compromise, adoption of a resolution favoring a Soli-
darity-soonsored referendum on the worker's-management issue, re-election of
Lech Walesa as Solidarity Chairman, election of a new KKP (now called national
Commission, KK), and formulation of an organizational programme. The Drogramme
Solidarity's rationalization for its place in society, claimed that:
. . . Solidarity, having arisen as a 'orotest against the 
existing system of exercising oower', desired 'genuinely 
to soc'alize the system of management'; the economy should 
be rebuilt ' on the basis of democracy and all-round social 
initiative'. The Resolution demanded 'philosophical, social, 
political and cultural pluralism* and in oarticular legisla­
tion to guarantee basic civil liberties and social control 
of the mass media. Finally it called for an 'anti-crisis 
agreement'; Solidarity was willing 'to hold an honest and 
loyal dialogue' with the authorities. 39
Although calling for an "anti-crisis agreement," Solidarity members must have
realized that political pluralism and Party supremacy could never mesh.
Whether or not theCongress delegates fully grasped the contradiction be­
tween their stated aims and Coraminist dictates, PUWP members certainly did. 
Under pressure from within the Party, First Secretary Kania resigned on 18 
October and was succeeded by Prime Minister Jaruzelski, who quickly took the
offensive against Solidarity. Jaruzelski publicly favored changes of earlier 
government-solidarity agreements, and Secretary Olszowskl quickly followed by 
announcing Solidarity's demise if riohtest tendencies weren't eliminated.
Both sides engaged in threats and polemics, and Solidarity carried out several 
strikes. As the situation threated to explode, Walesa, Jaruszelski, and Arch­
bishop Glemp met for discussions (on 4 December). Following the meeting,
mtensions somewhat abated* and joint government-solidarity working groups
an
were formed. 3y the end of the month* however, tensions flared again.
The renewal of mutual antagonism resulted largely *rom Solidarity’s de­
mand for union oversight of government economic reforms before they went to 
the Sejm. When the government sent draft laws on various economic measures 
(including enterprise management and the 1982 provisional budget- to the 
Sejm without consulting Solidarity, intense opposition immediately surfaced.
Moreover, by forcible ending a strike of Fire Brigade College cadets short-
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ly thereafter, the regime added to the air of an impending clash.
During a meeting in Radom on 3 December, Solidary responded to the govern­
ment’s actions. First, the KK charged the regime with having “chosen the way
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of force and [with having] rejected a dialogue.” The union leadership also 
decried the government's refusal to consult Solidarity (the oversight issue) 
and its insistence on obtaining emergency powers to ban strikes. In the event 
the emergency powers were granted, Solidarity threatened to invoke a general 
strike.
The eye-to-eye standoff continued up until the Solidarity KK meeting in 
Odensk on 11 and 12 December. At the meeting, the radicals in the union's 
leadership, angered by government resistance to reform, prooosed a national 
referendum on the existing political system and the leadership of First Secre­
tary Jaruzelski. 43 At midnight of 12 December, General Jaruartlski institute 
martial law (official announcement atOSQQGMT), thereby initiating the arrests 
§# opposition figures (some 5,000 in all), suspending civil liberties, and 
halting the reform process. Nearly five months later, martial law continues 
in Poland with little sign of letting up. The ultimate fate of Solidarity re-
mains unclear; however, one can be certain that if the leadership provides 
Solidarity a place in Polish society, it will be a transformed and laroel/ 
emasculated Solidarity, one presenting no significant challenge to the re-
Canclusions
As seems to have been the case in our othe*’ examuies >f reform move­
ments, Poland (1980-81) presents both common and unique elements. For ex­
ample, Poland's recent struggle for refor" shared the element g- economic 
stagnation with all the aforementioned upheavals. !n addition, similar to 
developments in Pilsen and Berlin (1953), Hungary (1956), and Poland (1956 
and 1970), a triggering incident touched off the uprisings of the Solidarity 
era. Likewise, in having experienced only a relatively mild political re­
laxation prior to the onset of the reform process oropar, recent Polish e- 
vents parallel elements of the Czechoslovak (1968) and Polish (1970) move­
ments. For the most part, however, the similarities end here, and Poland of 
the early 1980's becomes unique.
First, unlike the absence of substantial intellectual guidance in the 
Pilsen* Berlin, and Polish (1970) examples and the leadership of Party in­
tellectuals in the Polish (1956), Hungarian, and Czechoslovak cases, Poland 
(1930) witnessed the Importance of a non-Party intellectual organization 
(KOR) in helping unite and organize opposition to the regime. Moreover, the 
reform process 1n Poland (1980-81) was carried out by the workers and didn't 
follow nor wholely depend on the rise of a progressive Party faction but, 
rather, initiated it. In this respect, by representing a true reform process
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Initiated from the "bottom", Solidarity's Poland is unique. Finally, 
though a dubious recognition, the halting of reforms through the imposition 
of martial law also signifies an event unparalleled in bloc history.
Although keeping in mind the novelty of recent Polish events, one can 
see, nevertheless, that two basic elements conducive to reform movements, 
economic stagnation and intellectual leadership, were present. VIso, an 
Atmosphere of liberalization, though not initially prevalent, was quickly 
spurred once the reform movement crystalized— as was the case in Czechoslo­
vakia in 1968. Therefore, our model of factors conducive fo reform and 
revolution apparently is flexible enough to encompass such extraordinary 
developments as were exhibited in Poland between August 1980 and December 
1981.
VII. The Soviet Factor
Considerations Influencing Use of MiT1 tai*y Force
Until now, Soviet military intervention against East b’oc reform move­
ments, esoecially factors influencing such action, was merely touched ur>on; 
nevertheless, because the fate of significant bloc changes ultimately rests 
with Moscow, a more detailed examination is necessary. Specifically, in 
light of the considerable tine and research devoted to this topic by the 
Western scholar Christopher D. Jones, a review of his findings seems in or­
der. 1
A fundamental argument forwarded by Jones, one trulv focusino on
the crux of Soviet East European policy, claims that whatever Soviet mili­
tary or ideological objectives may be, their successful implementation de­
pends on Soviet control over the various East European Partv leaderships 
and their (the Parties'Icontinued maintenance of power.“ As a result, the 
rise of a Party faction favoring autonomy or the collapse of Party oower 
would invite a Soviet intervention. Jones also argues that although the 
collapse of Communist power almost assuredly would necessitate a Soviet in­
vasion, the rise of an autonomous Party faction might be successful if four
conditions were met:
. . .  (1) that of mobilizing regular and paramilitary forces 
for prolonged resistance to aSoviet military occupation; (2) 
that of maintaining the continuity of political leadership 
underground or in exile; (3) that of branding anv prospective 
collaborators as traitors to the cause of national sovereignty; 
and (4) that of mobilizing international support for a war of 
national liberation against the Soviet army.3
The groundwork for Jones's arguments rests in Soviet military theory, 
particularly those aspects dealing with troop cohesion and morale. Accord­
ing to Jones, Soviet doctrine stresses that troop perception of whether a 
war Is "just" (in defense of the nation) or "unjust" (aimed at expansion) 
will significantlyinfluencebattlefield performance, especially for multi­
national armies such as the Red Army. More importantly, however, battle­
field failures suffered during an unjust war are said to have a "reverse 
effect" whereby domestic strains are intensified:
As a result of the 'reverse effect’, a government may face
threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its
homefront, and possibly even to the legitimacy of the regime 
itself. 4
Armed with a basic outline of factors believed to influence Soviet use of 
military force, we may now examine how our various East bloc crises es­
caped or invited Soviet Intervention.
Application of Criteria 
(Berlin and Pilsen, 1953)
In Berlin, Soviet occuoation forces formed the power base of the ruling 
regime. The East German Communist Party was not seeking to break away from 
the Soviets but, rather, needed Soviet troops in order to quell the worker
riots and prevent a possible collapse of Party rule. With World War II rela­
tively fresh in the minds of Soviet troops, application of military force was 
easily portrayed as "just". Moreover, since the East Germans oosed no real 
threat of resistance, military suppression involved minimal risks. In Pilsen 
on the other hand, the Czechoslovak Coronunist Party’s loyalty to Moscow and 
independent ability to smash worker resistance precluded the need for Soviet 
action.
(Poland, 1956)
Unlike our 1953 examples, Poland 1956 reoresented an actual reform 
movement, one 1n which domestic autonomy from the Soviets was souqht. By 
undermining Soviet control of the Polish Communist Party, Gomuika and the 
orooressives flirted with Soviet intervention; however, Gomuika's ability 
to mobilize national support for his leadership (including large-scale 
armed resistance if necessary), the unity of purpose characterizing the 
progressive leadership, and the discrediting of the Natolin faction acted 
to deter a Soviet intervention. Furthermore, although the Soviets main­
tained the ability to crush the Polish movement, Moscow undoubtedly recog­
nized the susceptibility of such a war to being perceived as "uriust" once
s
bitter and united Polish resistance was encountered.
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(Hungary and Czechoslovakia)
The restraint demonstrated by the Soviets in Poland did not occur 1n 
Hungary nor in Czechoslovakia. Because Hungary witnessed an end to one- 
party rule, a collapse of the Communist Party's apparatus, and a failure of 
the res1Stan« forces to consolidate and, thereby, coordinate opposition to 
Soviet use of military force, a Soviet invasion involved relatively low risks, 
particularly after most Hungarian military units were keot out of the fighting 
while the payoff in terms of maintaining Soviet control was 1arae.'1
Likewise, in pursuing autonomy from the Soviets, neglecting military 
preparations, and failing to make issue of national sovereignty, the Oubcek 
leadership in Czechoslovakia also Invited a Soviet invasion. According to 
Jones, if the sustained and widespread occurrence of post-invasion nassive
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resistance and outbreak of large-scale demonstrations following Jan Palachs 
protest by self-immolation were any Indicator of national sentiments, Oubcek 
missed a key pre-invasion opportunity to mobilize popular defense of the na­
tion and simultaneously to discredit Soviet sympathizers within the Party. 
Moreover, had the progressive leadership foilowed-up on calls for an Indepen­
dent Czechoslovak military doctrine, made preparations for armed defense of 
the nation, and rallied the populace around the sovereignty Issue, Jones con­
cludes a Soviet Invasion may nave been deterred.
(Poland, 197n and 19«n-«l’.
The two major Polish upheavals of the last decade failed to provoke a 
Soviet Invasion but for different reasons. In 1970, derek's ability to 
placate the populace with promises o* a better future— while simultaneously 
convincing Moscow of Poland's continued loyalty— prevented the need for a 
Soviet Invasion. In 1981, on the other hand. General Jaruzelskt's successful 
suppression of Solidarity by using Polish troops ended threats to Party rule 
(at least for the time being) and, therefore, saved the Soviets the trouble 
of doing It themselves.
tm
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Having examined various elements believed to be conducive to reform and 
revolution and drawn our conclusions during the course of the examination, we 
may now summarize the findings. First, economic stagnation, an increased at­
mosphere of liberalization, and the leadership of intellectual organizations—  
the three chief factors comprising our model— were found to promote reform 
movements. In fact, economic staonation alone could incite an insurrection; 
however, an increased atmosphere of liberalization (either before or soon af­
ter mass turmoil) and the leadership of an intellectual organization were 
generally needed for mass ooposition to solidify into a reform movement. Fur­
thermore, the severity of economic difficulties, the degree of political re­
laxation, and the assertiveness of intellectual organizations affected the 
scope of changes.
As regards other factors explored, we found that a triggering incident- 
one sparking the onset of mass opposition— was present in all our examoles with 
the exception of 1968 Czechoslovakia. In addition, reform Party factions and 
their heads were found to play a crucial role in expanding or limiting the 
scope of changes. For example, Dubcek and his liberal followers did much to 
expand the scope of Czechoslovak reforms (1968); while Gomulka and associates, 
banking on popular support and skillful political naneuverlngs, succeeded in 
gradually reversing the Polish reforms of 1956 once consolidating power.
Finally, it also was argued, based on the findtiqs of Christopher D. Jones, 
that Moscow's interests in Eastern Europe were best served by continued Soviet 
control over the Communist Parties of the bloc; therefore, when a Party's
V I I I .  Summation
GG
power collapsed or a Party faction sought autonomy, the danger of a Soviet
military Intervention became very real. Indeed, it was demonstrated that
although a Soviet Intervention almost certainly would fol low the col lapse
of a Party's power, such aggression might be deterred by a Party faction
bent on autonomy 1f the following four conditions were net:
. . . . (1) that of mobilizing regular and paramilitary forces 
for prolonged resistance to a Soviet military occupation; (2] 
that of maintaining the continuity of political leadership un­
derground or in exile; (3) that of branding any prospective 
collaborators as traitors to the cause of national sovereignty; 
and (4) that of mobilizing international support for a war of 
national liberation against the Soviet army. 1
for a schematic summation of the author's findings, the reader should see 
Tables 1 and 2.
Table V: Facto rs Conducive to  Upheaval and Reform
Economic
Stagnation
Atmosphere
of
Liberalization
leadership
of
Intellectual
Organization
Triggering
Incident
Pllsen (1953) Yes *lo No New
Currency
Policy
Berlin (1953) Yes NO No Higher
Production
Norms
Poland (1956) Yes Substantial
"Thaw"
Krzywe Kolo
Writer's
Union
Wage
dispute—  
Poznan Up- 
R i s i n g
Hungary (1956) Yes Substantial
"Thaw"
Petofi 
Circle 
Writers1 
Union
/>VH (Security
police)
Attack
Czechoslovakia (1968) Yes After Rise 
of
Progressive
Leadership
Student
Associations
Writers'
Union
NO
Poland (1970) Yes Limited No priceHikes
Poland (1980-81) Yes United until 
August 1980
KOR p f ice Hi kes
Strikes
Table 2 : Factors Deterring Soviet Intervention*
Military
Preoaredness
Continuity
of
Political
Leadership
Discrediting
of
Soviet
Sympathizers
Interntional 
Support for 
War of 
National 
Liberation
I n ­
t e r -
ven-
tion•yi'
Poland (1956) Yes Yes Yes— Natol in 
Faction
Not
Needed
No
Hungary (1956) Uncoordina­
ted
Collapse
of
Leadershio
Communists in 
General,
Oiscredi ted
«* *
No Foreign 
Mil itary 
Aid
Yes
Czechoslovakia (1963) No Yes Not until
after
Invasion
Unexplored
Ootion
Yes
* Our other examples of upheavals are not included because either the Party 
was capable of handling any threat indeoendent of Moscow or autonomy from 
Moscow was not sought.
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